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The Wages of Human Trafficking 
Rana M. Jaleel† 
INTRODUCTION 
President Barack Obama has pledged a “zero tolerance” 
approach to human trafficking—a crime that, in his words, “ought 
to concern every person, because it is a debasement of our 
common humanity[,] . . . every community, because it tears at our 
social fabric[,] . . . every business, because it distorts markets[, 
and] . . . every nation, because it endangers public health and 
fuels violence and organized crime.”1 This stance is hardly 
controversial. Pundits and practitioners alike continue to deplore 
the occurrence of human trafficking. Yet while President Obama’s 
remarks may well reflect a growing national and international 
consensus, recent and conflicting reinterpretations of the 
elements of human trafficking have destabilized the definition of 
the crime and thus its scope and meaning. 
The legal definition of human trafficking—which is 
remarkably consistent across U.S. federal2 and international 
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 1 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Clinton Global 
Initiative (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/09/25/
president-obama-speaks-clinton-global-initiative-annual-meeting#transcript [http://perma.
cc/Q5HT-62W7] (follow “Read the Transcript” hyperlink) [hereinafter Remarks by the 
President]. 
 2 Section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) defines “severe 
forms of trafficking in persons” as either “sex trafficking” (“the recruitment, harboring, 
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex 
act,” which was “induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to 
perform such act has not attained 18 years of age”) or labor trafficking (“the recruitment, 
harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, 
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary 
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery”). The TVPA understands the term 
“commercial sex act” to encompass “any sex act on account of which anything of value 
is given to or received by any person.” Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. 
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law3—has been subject to wide-ranging interpretations.4 Pared to 
its core elements, human trafficking requires (1) an act (the 
movement, recruitment, receipt, or harboring of men, women, or 
children); (2) a means (by force, fraud, or coercion); and (3) a 
purpose (at a minimum, involuntary servitude, slavery, or sexual 
or labor exploitation, which may include the removal of organs). 
While human trafficking was once viewed as functionally 
equivalent to criminalized sexual gender violence,5 recent scholarly 
and legal efforts have targeted labor-sector human trafficking, 
specifically migrant labor exploitation.6 This nascent focus on labor 
exploitation, while a step in the right direction, is nonetheless 
insufficient to address the global problem of human trafficking. 
Recent changes in how the U.S. State Department interprets the 
federal anti-trafficking statute, or the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act (TVPA),7 prove this point.  
L. No. 106-386, div. A, 114 Stat. 1466, 1469-70 (codified as amended in sections of 8, 18, 
and 22 U.S.C.), amended by Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875; (codified in sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.), 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 
Stat. 3558 (2006); (codified in sections of 18, 22, and 42 U.S.C.), William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 
Stat. 5044 (codified in sections of 6, 8, 18, 22, and 42 U.S.C.), Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2013 Pub. L. No. 113-14, tit. XII, 127 Stat. 54, 136-60 (Title XII of the 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013) [hereinafter TVPA].  
 3 Article 3, paragraph (a) of the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319, 344 
[hereinafter U.N. Trafficking Protocol], instead sets minimums on what will constitute 
exploitation. The U.N. Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking in persons as 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of 
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 
U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra, at 344. 
 4 See Sally Engle Merry, How Big is the Trafficking Problem? The Mysteries 
of Quantification, OPENDEMOCRACY (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/
beyondslavery/sally-engle-merry/how-big-is-trafficking-problem-mysteries-of-quantification 
[http://perma.cc/PS3K-N4JF] (discussing how definitions of human trafficking are not 
only “vague, overlapping, and even contradictory, but . . . [also] changing over time”). 
 5 See, e.g., Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: 
Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655, 
1657 (2010) (demonstrating that sex-sector trafficking and prostitution dominate 
human trafficking policies and debates) [hereinafter Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking].  
 6 See, e.g., Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of 
Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 609, 609-11 (2014) (noting the emergence 
of a labor approach to human trafficking) [hereinafter Chuang, Exploitation Creep]. 
 7 Since 2004, the TIP Office has steadily adopted expansive interpretations 
of “harboring” and “receipt,” terms listed in the act element of international and 
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In 2012, the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons 
Office (TIP Office) declared that “many forms of enslavement”8 lie 
at the heart of the phenomenon of human trafficking—“[h]uman 
[t]rafficking can include but does not require movement.”9 This 
eschewal of any movement or recruitment requirement has 
resulted in the elimination of any distinction between human 
trafficking and forced labor.10 This development, as well as the 
 
domestic anti-trafficking law. These acts alone are sufficient to support a charge of 
human trafficking—no movement or recruitment by a third party is required. During 
the George W. Bush administration, the distancing of human trafficking from any 
movement requirement facilitated President Bush’s position that all prostitution 
(whether consensual or not) could constitute a violation of human trafficking law. Now 
that the Obama administration has broken with the Bush-era interpretation and set 
its sights on non-sex-sector labor trafficking, the absence of the movement requirement 
has assumed new significance. The lack of a movement requirement has allowed prior 
distinctions between trafficked and nontrafficked forced labor to conceptually crumble. 
In this way, the Obama administration may subsume all forced labor within the ambit 
of human trafficking. See infra Section III.A; see also Chuang, Exploitation Creep, 
supra note 6, at 609-11. Forced labor is defined under international law as “work or 
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for 
which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” Convention Concerning 
Forced or Compulsory Labour, opened for signature June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55, 58 
(entered into force May 1, 1932); see also Convention Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, opened for 
signature June 17, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13405, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Nov. 
19, 2000); Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, opened for signature 
June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959); Convention 
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, opened for signature June 28, 1930, 39 
U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932). 
 8 Article 1 of the International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and 
Slavery establishes the benchmark definition of slavery: “Slavery is the status or condition 
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised.” International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 
1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 2191, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 263 [hereinafter 1926 Slavery Convention]. 
 9 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 33 (2012). Until 2009, 
the TIP Office actively resisted substantive conflation of the concepts of human 
trafficking and slavery, naming force, fraud, and coercion—not slavery—as the root of the 
crime. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2009) (“The common 
denominator of trafficking scenarios is the use of force, fraud, or coercion to exploit a 
person for profit.”). By 2014, however, the conflation of human trafficking with slavery 
was all but complete. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 29 
(2014) (“Human trafficking can include, but does not require, movement. People may be 
considered trafficking victims regardless of whether they were born into a state of 
servitude, were transported to the exploitative situation, previously consented to work for 
a trafficker, or participated in a crime as a direct result of being trafficked. At the heart of 
this phenomenon is the traffickers’ goal of exploiting and enslaving their victims and the 
myriad coercive and deceptive practices they use to do so.”). 
 10 See infra Section III.A; see supra note 7 and accompanying text. The U.S. 
Department of State linked forced labor to human trafficking in the following manner: 
Also known as involuntary servitude, forced labor may result when unscrupulous 
employers exploit workers made more vulnerable by high rates of unemployment, 
poverty, crime, discrimination, corruption, political conflict, or even cultural 
acceptance of the practice. Immigrants are particularly vulnerable, but individuals 
also may be forced into labor in their own countries. Female victims of forced or 
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simultaneous equation of human trafficking with slavery, has far-
reaching implications for human trafficking’s meaning. In 
essence, these interpretative shifts have pulled the legal 
conceptualization of human trafficking in two directions. In the 
first, human trafficking is a labor problem, as the elimination of 
distinctions between trafficked forced labor and nontrafficked 
forced labor suggests. In the second, it is an ownership problem of 
a different sort: human trafficking is slavery. 
These developments raise extremely pressing questions. 
How does the United States enforce a “zero tolerance” approach to 
human trafficking if it has no clear, conceptual understanding of 
what the act of human trafficking entails? To put a finer point on 
it, what is human trafficking “more like”: a labor problem or a 
slavery problem? The stakes of these questions become readily 
apparent when we recognize the revocation of the movement 
requirement and the equation of human trafficking with slavery 
as indicative of an early, emerging split between U.S. and 
international perspectives on human trafficking. While the 
United States has characterized human trafficking as a problem 
of slavery, the international community has largely sought to 
preserve distinctions between the variety of acts encompassed by 
anti-trafficking instruments, including distinctions between 
slavery, forced labor, and an array of lesser labor exploitations.11 
The urgency of the problem of human trafficking, together 
with its doctrinal complexity, demands a principled exploration of 
its limits. This article takes up the challenge by asking a seemingly 
straightforward question: What is the wrong of human trafficking? 
In the 14 years since the advent of contemporary human 
trafficking laws, this question has yet to be addressed by legal 
scholars. Now it is time to ask the question anew. For while we 
may intuitively believe that we will “know it when we see it,” the 
continuously transfiguring terrain of human trafficking law has 
only offered disparate examples of what human trafficking might 
be with no underlying theoretical account of why all acts 
 
bonded labor, especially women and girls in domestic servitude, are often sexually 
exploited as well. 
What is Modern Slavery?, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/what/index.htm 
[http://perma.cc/8QUC-FA68] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
 11 See infra Part IV; see also Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 6, at 
619-20 (describing how the TIP Office has used forced-labor creep to justify expanding 
its “bureaucratic turf” to cover practices traditionally considered by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) and the U.S. Department of Labor’s International Labor 
Affairs Bureau to be nontrafficked forced labor (i.e., forced labor not preceded by a 
process of movement or recruitment) and also how “slavery creep” has been used to 
justify the international expansion of U.S. criminal authority). 
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prohibited by extant law are in fact actionable. While there are no 
fast and easy rules or tests to identify human trafficking, settling 
a conceptual approach helps ensure a more targeted, steady, and 
uniform forward course of action by establishing what we 
understand human trafficking to be, why we act against it, how we 
might prevent it, and in turn, what it means to be a free person. 
Accounting for the wrong of human trafficking is therefore no 
theoretical indulgence, but an operational imperative. 
Accordingly, this article does not analyze human 
trafficking from within the familiar frames of transnational 
crime, sexualized gender violence, or human rights. Nor does it 
consider human trafficking to be best described as a problem of 
slavery or a problem faced largely by migrant workers. Each of 
these approaches fails to capture the core wrong of human 
trafficking. Instead, this article views human trafficking as a labor 
and employment problem that fits under what I call the new low-
wage/vulnerable labor paradigm. In this account, human 
trafficking is wrong because it exploits worker vulnerability, 
regardless of migrant status, by forcing, coercing, or deceiving 
people into performing work (including commercial sex acts) 
under intolerable, illicit, or degrading conditions.12 Therefore, 
human trafficking law should not be understood solely as a 
corrective to state failure to manage migrant workers, but rather 
as a lens through which to see the connections between human 
trafficking and domestic low-wage labor markets. 
In advocating for a low-wage/vulnerable labor approach to 
human trafficking, this article argues that U.S. attempts to cast 
human trafficking as in essence a crime of enslavement are both 
descriptively and normatively incorrect. Casting all forms of 
human trafficking as slavery does not reflect the actual conditions 
and contexts from which prosecutable charges of human trafficking 
may arise. Further, the charged rhetoric of slavery can obscure how 
dire the conditions of erstwhile “freely chosen” work can be, thus 
reinforcing an inaccurate and perilous normative divide that casts 
all that falls beyond the rubric of slavery as “free.” The question 
that scholars and practitioners of human trafficking law should 
be asking at this time is not “what does it mean to be a slave in 
the twenty-first century?” but rather “what does it mean to be a 
worker in the twenty-first century global economy?” 
 
 12 The term “vulnerable labor” denotes a methodological commitment to 
Martha Albertson Fineman’s vulnerability theory, which emphasizes the structural 
and institutional arrangements that the state has or will create to manage human 
vulnerability. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring 
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008). 
568 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
Additionally, this article contends that the emerging labor 
approach, which uses migrant labor as a template for 
understanding human trafficking, is also descriptively and 
normatively incorrect. Current human trafficking debates that 
offer the separate but overlapping paradigms of slavery and labor 
migration as palliatives to dominant criminal gender violence 
approaches are conceptually conflicted. They are caught between 
construing the wrong of human trafficking as a violation of 
equality (with a slavery paradigm positing a discriminatory 
dimension to a problem of individual ownership) or as a violation 
of labor rights (understood in the classic sense as collective rights 
that govern structural relationships between employers and 
employees and not solely as the provisioning of equal treatment 
for exploited migrant laborers). 
Neither approach accounts for the full range of acts 
proscribed by the widely adopted U.N. Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children (U.N. Trafficking Protocol)13 and the TVPA.14 
Simply put, the legal definition of human trafficking encompasses 
more than acts of slavery, be it sexual or otherwise, and applies to 
both migrant and nonmigrant workers. Less severe exploitation, 
including the accumulation of poor labor conditions that 
individually would not constitute actionable exploitation, have 
also been interpreted as prohibited under the legal definition of 
human trafficking—and largely overlooked.15 This discretionary 
oversight means that many migrant and nonmigrant low wage 
and vulnerable workers whose working conditions might 
warrant a charge of human trafficking fail to receive legal 
analysis or attention. 
Theorizing and foregrounding the wrong of human 
trafficking through the new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm 
captures the full range of offenses proscribed by human 
trafficking law, from slavery to forced labor and other lesser 
 
 13 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 14 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 15 See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, THE COST OF COERCION: GLOBAL REPORT UNDER 
THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS 
AT WORK 5-9, 13 (2009) [hereinafter ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009] (describing the Delphi 
indicators of human trafficking, which do not depend upon physical force or coercion); 
see also INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, OPERATIONAL INDICATORS OF TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN 
BEINGS: RESULTS FROM A DELPHI SURVEY IMPLEMENTED BY THE ILO AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2009) [hereinafter ILO OPERATIONAL INDICATORS REPORT] 
(listing operational indicators for human trafficking and detailing how they were 
established via the Delphi method); see infra Section IV.C. 
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exploitations.16 All the while, the new paradigm understands the 
wrong that binds these offenses to be a collective wrong that 
inheres in the inner workings of global labor markets, manifests 
in specific employment conditions, and affects migrant and 
nonmigrant workers alike. Further, the new paradigm identifies 
how the existing labor paradigm—which focuses almost 
exclusively on the specific vulnerabilities of migrant labor—has 
limited analytically the would-be structural scope of a labor 
analysis by construing the wrong of human trafficking as 
functionally an equality or autonomy wrong. That view, what I 
call the labor migration paradigm, focuses on affording migrant 
workers the same protections as nonmigrant workers in order to 
end exploitative working conditions. Recent empirical research, 
however, has thrown the general conditions of the U.S. low-wage 
labor market—and the efficacy of existing labor and employment 
protections—into question.17 Given this context, this article 
suggests that a low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm best 
describes the wrong of human trafficking while avoiding the 
pitfalls of narrow analyses of equality. 
While a labor migration paradigm helpfully emphasizes 
how cumulative labor conditions, characterized by subtly 
coercive and deceptive employment practices, can also cross the 
threshold into human trafficking,18 it cabins the full import of 
that claim. It does so by limiting its analysis to migrant workers 
and specific types of work, often identifying “sectors prone to 
human trafficking”—from agriculture, home health care, service, 
begging, domestic work, and manufacturing, to name a few19—as 
the target of legal and social interventions.20 In contrast, the new 
 
 16 See Jonathan Todres, Human Rights, Labor, and the Prevention of Human 
Trafficking: A Response to A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 142, 145-46 (2013) (arguing that labor-based and human rights-based responses 
are not mutually exclusive). Crucially, understanding the wrong of human trafficking as a 
low wage/vulnerable labor wrong does not automatically put it at odds with human rights or 
even criminal law frameworks, although a classic understanding of labor rights can mitigate 
against the excessive individualism of these two approaches. Id. at 152-53. And in New 
York, for example, violations of state labor laws are increasingly met with criminal 
prosecution. See Juan Gonzalez, State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman Says Those Who 
Knowingly Violate State Labor Laws Will Face Criminal Charges and Possible Jail Time, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 13, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/state-
attorney-general-eric-schneiderman-knowingly-violate-state-labor-laws-face-criminal-
charges-jail-time-article-1.1113537 [http://perma.cc/XLT7-Y7A5]. 
 17 See infra Section IV.D. 
 18 See ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009, supra note 15, at 13; ILO OPERATIONAL 
INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 15; see also Hila Shamir, A Labor Paradigm for 
Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 86-87 (2012). 
 19 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 73-74 (2009). 
 20 Id. 
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paradigm’s more general emphasis on the conditions of low-wage 
and vulnerable work prevents a too-narrow focus on job sectors 
or categories whose susceptibility to human trafficking may 
change over time.21 Additionally, the new low-wage/vulnerable 
labor paradigm frames the problem of labor as one that 
explicitly traverses the categories of migrant and nonmigrant 
workers. In doing so, it eliminates the current framework’s 
latent equality argument, which splinters the full potential of a 
labor analysis by viewing migrant labor as the template for 
understanding human trafficking. 
In this way, the new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm 
prevents us from ignoring how contemporary conditions of low-
wage work—including unenforced or underenforced employment 
law—not only enable human trafficking, but continue to exploit 
those who survive their trafficking only to enter what can be an 
equally exploitative low-wage labor market. Therefore, the new 
low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm does not foreground 
movement/recruitment as the heart of the offense and cautions 
against axiomatic separations between, for example, trafficked 
and nontrafficked forced labor. That hard distinction rests on the 
fallacy that nontrafficked forced laborers inevitably have more 
control or agency than nontrafficked workers—an assumption 
that empirical research and on-the-ground observation have since 
undermined.22 Anchoring the wrong of human trafficking in a low-
wage/vulnerable labor paradigm thus mitigates the too-narrow 
focus on migrant labor while also correcting for the overwhelming 
emphasis on sex-sector human trafficking that still dominates 
legal efforts to quell the crime.23 
The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm would, 
however, not understand all instances of human trafficking as 
crimes of enslavement. The wrong of human trafficking exists less 
in its proximate relationship to slavery than it does in the systemic 
problems that inhere in low-wage labor. Perhaps most importantly, 
understanding the wrong of human trafficking as a low-
 
 21 See infra Section IV.A; ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, 
UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S 
CITIES 56 (2009), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/XLT7-Y7A5] (defining low-wage industries as those whose “median wage 
for front-line workers was less than 85 percent of the city’s median wage”). 
 22 See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 21, at 5. 
 23 Despite an increased interest in labor, prosecutions worldwide remain 
fixated on sex-sector human trafficking. The U.S. Department of State’s 2014 
Trafficking in Persons Report estimates that in 2013, the 44,758 trafficked persons 
identified worldwide resulted in only 9,460 prosecutions and 5,776 convictions. Only 
470 of these convictions were related to labor trafficking, while the rest were related to 
sex trafficking. 2014 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 9, at 45. 
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wage/vulnerable labor one will ward off the conceptual collapse of 
human trafficking and slavery by fostering principled discussion of 
where we now want to draw the line between exploitation of all 
stripes and what constitutes the impermissible ownership of 
persons as a jus cogen norm and crime of universal jurisdiction.24 
Finally, in advocating for a low-wage/vulnerable labor 
approach to human trafficking, this article does not mean to 
suggest that all low-wage labor abuses should be found to 
constitute human trafficking or that human trafficking law 
alone should be responsible for remedying widespread domestic 
workplace violations. Rather, this article seeks to establish a 
conceptual framework for human trafficking that identifies the 
problems of domestic low-wage labor that are at human 
trafficking’s very core. Acknowledging the overlap between 
human trafficking and domestic low-wage labor violations is not 
only necessary for a clear conceptual understanding of the wrong 
of human trafficking, it is also doctrinally supported by the 
expansive definition and remedies offered by our anti-trafficking 
federal statute, the TVPA, and international law. 
Since its 2003 reauthorization, the TVPA provides not 
only criminal avenues of redress, but also an underutilized 
private right of action for persons whose exploitation constitutes 
human trafficking.25 This private right of action was intended to 
provide more comprehensive relief to trafficked persons than that 
offered by civil suits brought solely under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act,26 analogous state employment laws, and state 
 
 24 See 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 8. Often thought to involve the 
destruction of a person’s juridical personality—the turning of a person with innate and 
assigned rights into a “thing”—slavery is an international crime and a peremptory or 
jus cogen norm. See Paul Finkleman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or 
Property?, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY 105-34 (Jean Allain ed., 2012). 
Jus cogen, or “compelling law,” norms outrank all other norms and principles. 
International crimes that rise to the level of jus cogens constitute obligatio 
erga omnes which are inderogable. Legal obligations which arise from the 
higher status of such crimes include the duty to prosecute or extradite, the 
non-applicability of statutes of limitations for such crimes, the non-
applicability of any immunities up to and including Heads of State, the non-
applicability of the defense of “obedience to superior orders” . . . , the 
universal application of these obligations whether in time of peace or war, 
their non-derogation under “states of emergency,” and universal jurisdiction 
over the perpetrators of such crimes. 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 63 (1996). 
 25 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-193, § 4(a)(4), 117 Stat. 2875, 2878. 
 26 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
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common law torts.27 Encouraging TVPA-based civil litigation of 
the lesser labor exploitation claims of migrant and nonmigrant 
workers is one way to put the new low-wage/vulnerable labor 
paradigm into practice and enable courts to establish the proper 
boundary between labor exploitation that amounts to human 
trafficking and other civil or regulatory labor exploitation. 
Accordingly, this article proceeds in five parts. Part I 
provides an overview of contemporary human trafficking law, 
including the civil and criminal rights of action offered by the 
TVPA. It then analyzes the dominant legal paradigms used to 
interpret human trafficking—the transnational criminal law, 
human rights, and gender justice paradigms. Each of the current 
paradigms fails in its own way to adequately explain or capture 
the full range of acts prohibited by human trafficking law. 
Crucially, each also diverts attention from the core problem of 
human trafficking—low-wage and vulnerable labor. 
Part II examines the emerging labor paradigm, which 
assumes its primary target to be migrant labor. Part III considers 
how a conceptual fusion between criminal acts of forced 
movement and economically motivated migration has fueled the 
vision of migrants as the paradigmatic subjects of human 
trafficking law. 
Part IV critiques the labor migration paradigm by assessing 
the strengths and limitations of the new low-wage/vulnerable labor 
 
 27 The U.N. Trafficking Protocol, the TVPA, and other anti-trafficking legal 
instruments provide remedies for trafficked persons beyond those offered by 
employment law. These include, for example, the TVPA’s “T-visa,” which enables some 
trafficked persons to remain in the country. See TVPA, Sec. 107(e), supra note 2. The 
TVPA also allows trafficked persons to recover payment of wages that exceed the 
federal minimum wage, an option that the FLSA does not provide. Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. A § 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. 1466, 1488 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (2012)). Additionally, the FLSA does not apply to all 
workers. Most relevant to this discussion, perhaps, the FLSA also does not cover forced 
prostitution. For these reasons, a human trafficking legal framework can address 
exploitation without the categorical restrictions imposed by domestic labor law, bridge 
migrant and nonmigrant worker exploitation, and provoke a broader discussion about 
labor, immigration, and general low-wage and vulnerable labor exploitation in the 
United States and around the world. For a more detailed discussion of civil remedies 
and the TVPA, see Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private 
Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 24-25 (2004) (assessing the benefits of civil litigation for trafficked 
persons as an alternative and in addition to criminal prosecution), Theodore R. 
Sangalis, Comment, Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked Person 
Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403, 431, 437-38 
(2011) (explaining why civil remedies under the TVPA have largely been unexplored by 
persons who have endured sex-sector human trafficking), and Jennifer S. Nam, The 
Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil Right of Action for Human Trafficking, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2007) (analyzing TVPA civil suits and reasons for their low 
numbers). Notably, these authors also retain a focus on migrant labor. 
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paradigm for human trafficking. To do so, this part juxtaposes the 
labor migration paradigm with recent sociological, empirical work 
on low-wage labor in the United States, which reveals widespread 
and systematic violations of the most basic workplace 
protections—the sort assumed to have been long addressed by 
domestic labor law. From this perspective, it becomes clear that 
the labor migration paradigm is conceptually tethered to specific 
ideas about who is most vulnerable to exploitation—ideas that are 
neither descriptively nor normatively correct. 
Part V then returns to the issue of slavery. Here, the 
article analyzes how a new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm 
for human trafficking might interface with ongoing debates about 
which vision of slavery should be controlling: de facto or de jure. 
This discussion helps illuminate what is at stake, in part, in 
naming the wrong of human trafficking and crafting a legal 
distinction between exploitation and impermissible ownership: 
the conversion of people into property. Understanding the wrong 
of human trafficking as a low-wage/vulnerable labor one best fits 
anti-trafficking law’s broad scope while still preserving the 
integrity of related legal concepts. In short, human trafficking 
law, in doctrine and practice, must be understood within the 
context of historical and contemporary conceptions of labor and 
situated within the annals of the laws of work. 
I. THE PARAMETERS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING LAW 
Contemporary human trafficking laws were adopted a 
scant 15 years ago but have since taken a firm hold of the legal 
imagination. While human trafficking has become a global subject 
du jour, fault lines have emerged in the primary anti-trafficking 
legal instruments, namely the U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the 
TVPA. Intentionally broad language and vaguely defined 
enumerated elements have opened the door to conflicting legal 
approaches to human trafficking. 
Iterations of three conceptual approaches to interpreting 
human trafficking law currently dominate law and policy 
discussions. They are the transnational criminal law paradigm, the 
human rights paradigm, and the gender violence paradigm. Each 
has particular strengths and limitations in its characterization of 
the wrong of human trafficking. On balance, the shifting 
conceptualizations of human trafficking occur in response to the 
early dominance of a transnational criminal approach to human 
trafficking—one notable for an almost singular focus on the sexual 
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exploitation of women and children.28 This approach, championed 
by the George W. Bush administration, conflated voluntary and 
involuntary prostitution and other commercial sex acts, leading to 
the neglect of actionable instances of other forms of labor 
exploitation while obscuring the exploitation of men and LGBTQ 
persons.29 
A. The Elements of Human Trafficking 
Contemporary human trafficking law began at the turn of 
the millennium with the passage of two legal instruments: the 
U.N. Trafficking Protocol30 and the TVPA.31 The U.N. Trafficking 
Protocol has with notable consistency served as the template for 
subsequent human trafficking law. Since its enactment, this law 
has mushroomed into an international legal system comprised of 
“regional treaties, abundant interpretive guidance, a range of 
policy instruments, and a canon of state practice.”32 According to 
the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime’s 2014 Global Report 
on Trafficking in Persons, the U.N. Human Trafficking Protocol 
has been ratified by 162 countries and is nothing short of a 
“success story.”33 
The U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA introduced 
new definitions of human trafficking that, by virtue of their 
capaciousness and calculated association with transnational 
organized crime, ushered the issue to international prominence.34 
The TVPA and the U.N. Trafficking Protocol each provide a 
tripartite definition of human trafficking. The crime requires an 
act (the movement, recruitment, receipt, or harboring of men, 
women, or children) accomplished by a means (by force, fraud, or 
coercion) for a purpose (at a minimum, involuntary servitude, 
 
 28 Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1657. 
 29 See id. 
 30 See U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3. 
 31 See TVPA, supra note 2. See U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3.  
 32 See Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking: Quagmire 
or Firm Ground? A Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789, 791 (2009). 
 33 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 15 (2014). 
 34 The 1998 and 1999 intergovernmental meetings that resulted in the U.N. 
Human Trafficking Protocol were by all accounts rushed; their primary purpose was to 
achieve an international cooperation agreement on its parent convention, the U.N. 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. See Gallagher, supra note 32, at 
789-93. That human trafficking was placed under the auspices of the U.N. Office on 
Drugs and Crime and not kept in its historical home within the U.N. human rights 
system was itself quite controversial. For a full description of the process, see id. 
2016] THE WAGES OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 575 
slavery, or sexual or labor exploitation, which may include the 
removal of organs).35 
From the start, the definition of human trafficking has 
hardly been exact. For the sake of consensus among states, the 
elements of the emerging crime of human trafficking were left 
intentionally vague. The elements of the means component (force, 
fraud, and coercion) are also not explicitly defined in international 
law. Further, under the U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA, 
the question of what degree of coercion or abuse of power satisfies 
this definitional prong remains an open one.36 These instruments 
also codify a distinction between sexual exploitation and labor 
exploitation—a framework that has contributed to the gendered, 
hypersexual focus of much human trafficking law, policy, and 
discourse.37 Moreover, the U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the 
TVPA each neglect to define the new legal term “exploitation” in a 
targeted way, fostering uncertainty as to the conditions under 
which exploitation amounts to human trafficking.38 It is also 
important to note that exploitation is enumerated not as a 
separate offense, but as an element of the crime of human 
trafficking.39 
 
 35 See TVPA, supra note 2, at § 103; U.N. Trafficking Protocol, art. 3, supra note 3.  
 36 See Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 
409, 414 (2011) (noting how “the laws addressing human trafficking continue to struggle 
with delineating the dimensions of coercion” and calling for a theory of “‘situational 
coercion,’ . . . [which] recognizes that instead of experiencing coercion through direct threats 
of harm from their traffickers, many trafficked workers comply with abusive working 
conditions due to circumstances that render them vulnerable to the exploitation”). 
 37 No reputable research has ever demonstrated that women are more vulnerable 
to human trafficking than men, yet women’s sexual exploitation is the most commonly 
identified form of human trafficking. As a result, it appears that “a disproportionate number 
of trafficking victims are women.” See Michael T. Tien, Human Trafficking: The Missing 
Male Victim, 18 PUB. INT. L. REP. 207, 208 (2013) (arguing that the 2013 reauthorization of 
the TVPA, which was added as an amendment to the Violence Against Women Act’s 
reauthorization, “ignores the prominence of male victims of human trafficking in the U.S. 
and abroad”); see also LAURA MARÍA AGUSTÍN, SEX AT THE MARGINS: MIGRATION, LABOUR 
MARKETS, AND THE RESCUE INDUSTRY 39 (2007) (observing that in human trafficking 
discourse, “men are routinely expected to encounter and overcome trouble, but women may 
be irreparably damaged by it”); Mike Dottridge, Introduction, in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE 
IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD 17 
(Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women ed., 2007) (arguing that human trafficking is 
perceived as a gendered issue and that “countries overlook the possibility that men can be 
trafficked”); Grace Chang & Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human 
Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the Field(s), 3 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. 
LIBERTIES 317, 320-21 (2007) (arguing that enforcement agencies’ focus on sex trafficking 
neglects the larger trafficking phenomenon). 
 38 See ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that “for the 
legal concept of exploitation, which underpins the definition of trafficking in the 
Palermo Protocol, there is almost no precedent in international law, nor is there much 
national legislation”). 
 39 See infra Section III.A. 
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As a result, both the U.N. Human Trafficking Protocol and 
the TVPA as written are amenable to vast interpretative shifts. 
Anne T. Gallagher, who participated in drafting the U.N. 
Trafficking Protocol, has lauded the broad definitional scope of 
human trafficking as the U.N. Trafficking Protocol’s main 
achievement.40 Gallagher has also praised the U.N. Trafficking 
Protocol’s gender-neutral language and inclusion of not only sex-
sector human trafficking, but also other kinds of labor-market 
exploitation.41 The strength of such an expansive definition of 
exploitation, however, is also its downside, in that it requires a 
continual recalibration of its focus and scope. These adjustments, 
which implicate the legal recognition of human trafficking, also 
affect the implementation of human trafficking law. Given, for 
example, the specific enforcement mechanisms authorized by the 
TVPA, identifying what constitutes human trafficking and in turn 
what actions the TVPA requires in response to it have significant 
geopolitical implications. 
While the TVPA and the U.N. Trafficking Protocol are 
compatible by letter of the law, the United States’ influence and 
ability to set the legal and policy terms of the global anti-
trafficking debate are difficult to overstate.42 The TVPA is 
infamous for the reach of its unilateral global sanctions regime.43 
The TVPA’s congressional sponsors believed that the eradication 
of human trafficking in the United States depended upon other 
countries’ behavior—namely their explicit cooperation with U.S. 
anti-trafficking efforts. The resulting unilateral sanctions regime 
empowers the U.S. government to deny nonhumanitarian, 
nontrade-related foreign assistance to any government perceived 
as noncompliant with U.S.-defined anti-trafficking “minimum 
standards.”44 In applying these minimum standards, the U.S. 
State Department considers and classifies countries as either 
origin, transit, or destination countries and issues an annual 
Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report) that details the state 
of human trafficking in countries across the world. Notably, the 
United States did not begin assessing its own human trafficking 
issues and including them in the TIP Report until 2012.45 
 
 40 Gallagher, supra note 32, at 791. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral 
Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 438-39 (2006). 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. A, 
§ 108, 114 Stat. 1466, 1480-81 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7106 (2012)). 
 45 See Remarks by the President, supra note 1. 
2016] THE WAGES OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 577 
It is against this backdrop that efforts to move human 
trafficking beyond the criminal prostitution reform debates that 
characterized its infancy46 occur—a backdrop where countries’ 
prior classifications as origin, transit, or destination countries 
linger even as new, expansive, non-sex-sector labor-inclusive 
interpretations of human trafficking are deployed, and even as 
the operational parameters of what constitutes human trafficking 
shift. This conceptual, legal, and geopolitical landscape has 
complicated the recognition of lesser labor offenses that might 
constitute human trafficking while keeping legal efforts too 
tightly focused on migrant labor. These shortfalls have occurred 
due to shifting paradigms that have, in turn, contributed to a 
shifting conception of the wrong of human trafficking. 
B. The Dominant Paradigms of Human Trafficking 
Contemporary human trafficking law rests at the 
intersection of three dominant paradigms: transnational criminal 
law, gender violence, and human rights. In practice, this 
conflation is nearly impossible to pry apart, so steeped is the 
language of criminal justice in the wrenching image of the 
stereotypical trafficked person: a woman, stripped of all rights, 
spirited to a strange locale, and forced into “sexual slavery.” 
Subsequent sections of this article will further explain how, given 
the current doctrine, adopting a low-wage labor paradigm best 
addresses the challenges of human trafficking, including sex-
sector human trafficking. First, however, close and comparative 
attention to how various legal paradigms conceive of the wrong of 
human trafficking—what they reveal and what they obscure—
can help illuminate the underlying visions of human freedom that 
motivate and animate human trafficking law. These conceptions 
of freedom have produced inadequate legal outcomes by failing to 
address and describe the range of actions prohibited by anti-
trafficking instruments. To ground the analysis of the wrong of 
human trafficking, this article asks: What kind of wrong is 
envisaged by the paradigms offered to explain it, who is at risk of 
suffering from it, and how does this notion of the wrong interact 
and intersect with other innovations in human trafficking law to 
construct the definition of freedom? 
 
 46 See infra Section I.B.2, Part II. 
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1. Human Trafficking as a Transnational Crime 
A criminal and law enforcement approach dominates 
current human trafficking law and policy.47 This criminal law 
paradigm deems the wrong of human trafficking a public one, 
wrought primarily by individual wrongdoers.48 The U.N. Human 
Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA each conceive of human 
trafficking as a critical state security issue deeply tied to 
transnational organized crime syndicates that facilitate 
clandestine and often illicit migration that targets primarily 
women and children.49 As such, efforts to stem or eliminate its 
occurrence exceed the sovereign prerogatives of immigration and 
border control that typically occupy a single state. Instead, as a 
transnational crime, human trafficking is construed as a global 
problem best approached by all states acting in concert. In other 
words, as a transnational crime, human trafficking is not merely 
an affront to sovereign state interests. It is an affront to justice 
and humanity that every state has a duty to criminalize. 
The transnationality of the crime of human trafficking 
therefore dictates powerful and extensive state intervention. 
Because networks of bad individuals commit the crime, the 
state is empowered to flush them out from wherever they 
might be, including ostensibly private spheres. By this logic, 
almost all efforts to combat human trafficking in an individual  
 47 See ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING 68 (2010) (arguing that “the 1990s marked an important shift in the 
international legal framework around trafficking” away from human rights approaches 
and toward a transnational organized crime model); Micah N. Bump, Treat the 
Children Well: Shortcomings in the United States’ Effort to Protect Child Trafficking 
Victims, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 73, 73 (2009) (“[T]he U.S. 
Government is taking a law enforcement approach and not a victim-centered approach 
to combating trafficking.”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-offs: Protecting 
Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 
1616 (2010); Dottridge, supra note 37, at 1 (“[T]he priority for governments around the 
world in their efforts to stop human trafficking has been to arrest, prosecute and 
punish traffickers, rather than to protect the human rights of people who have been 
trafficked.”); Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: 
Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 345-52 (2007); Jayne Huckerby, 
United States of America (USA), in COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-
TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD 230, 247 (Global 
Alliance Against Traffic in Women ed., 2007) (explaining how the U.S. government’s 
“prosecutorial focus often runs counter to the rights of trafficked persons”); Jonathan 
Todres, Widening Our Lens: Incorporating Essential Perspectives in the Fight Against 
Human Trafficking, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 53, 57-67 (2011). 
 48 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1823) 
(describing the theory of utilitarianism and the tension between criminal punishment 
and individual freedom).  
 49 See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. A, 
§ 102, 114 Stat. 1466, 1466; U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 343. 
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state’s domestic or civil sphere are justified, including the 
surveillance of private financial data by search engines alert to 
suspicious expenditures,50 enhanced border control,51 and 
armed raids of residences rumored to be housing commercial 
sexual activity.52 
While the wisdom of encouraging states to engage in 
what Jonathan Simon calls “governing through crime”53 is 
debatable, the stamp of transnational criminality and its 
expressive function is a weighty one that demands intensive 
mobilization of state resources, as well as moral condemnation.54 
From the sheer breadth of state participation, the enduring 
visibility of the issue, and its emphasis on the global nature of 
the problem, the transnational criminal law paradigm has 
 
 50 See John Reed, Palantir Now Fighting Human Traffickers, Instead of the 
U.S. Army, FOREIGN POLICY: THE COMPLEX (June 19, 2013, 10:24 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/19/palantir-now-fighting-human-traffickers-instead-of-
the-u-s-army/ [http://perma.cc/2NPN-BSLE].  
 51 Article 11 of the U.N. Trafficking Protocol and the Protocol Against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, each require the strengthening of 
border controls and enhanced cooperation between border control agencies. See U.N. 
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 348; Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 480, 512-13 [hereinafter Migrants 
Smuggling Protocol]. Additionally, Article 12 of those Protocols mandates that states 
ensure the integrity and security of their travel documents, while Article 13 of both 
Protocols requires state parties to verify at the request of another state party the 
legitimacy and validity of any travel documents purportedly released by them. See U.N. 
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 348; Migrants Smuggling Protocol, supra, at 513.  
 52 See Melissa Ditmore & Juhu Thukral, Accountability and the Use of Raids 
to Fight Trafficking, ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV. 134, 134 (2012) (arguing that “[d]ata from 
the United States suggests that raids conducted by local law enforcement agencies are 
an ineffective means of locating and identifying trafficked persons”). 
 53 For Jonathan Simon, “governing through crime” describes a remarkable 
and pronounced shift in the organization of late twentieth-century civil society, which 
he distills to three key corollaries: (1) the rise of crime as a crucial strategic issue, (2) 
the ability of the “fight against crime” to legitimate actions that have other 
motivations, and (3) the seepage of crime and criminal justice metaphors into other 
social institutions, including schools. Simon uses this phrase to describe how, since the 
1990s, the United States has “built a new civic and political order structured around 
the problem of violent crime.” In Simon’s account, these attempts to govern through 
crime have been profoundly undemocratic. Whether democracy is valued for its liberty 
or equality-enhancing features, he argues, governing through crime has exacerbated 
U.S. class and race-based social striations, as “the vast reorienting of fiscal and 
administrative resources toward the criminal justice system at both the federal and 
state level, has resulted in a shift aptly described as a transformation from a ‘welfare 
state’ to a ‘penal state.’” The role of the state has shifted from providing for its populace 
to policing it. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 3-6 (2007). 
 54 Criminal law’s expressive function is significant. The transnational 
criminalization of human trafficking expresses an international consensus that such 
exploitation is beyond the pale. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in 
Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 822 (1994) (describing how law affects social valuation). 
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certainly enjoyed some success, and it has undoubtedly 
safeguarded the rights and lives of many who would otherwise 
have suffered without recognition or redress. 
The harms that the transnational criminal law paradigm 
obscures, however, are equally consequential.55 First, by framing 
the wrong of human trafficking as a public offense committed by 
outlying wrongdoers, the criminal law paradigm ignores the 
structural conditions that facilitate human trafficking and diverts 
attention away from them. Such structural conditions include the 
inner workings of global markets,56 the interplay between 
immigration law and securitized border control,57 weak or 
underenforced labor laws,58 the broader private law backdrops 
against which human trafficking and other relevant law 
operates,59 and the state’s role and interests in maintaining these 
orders.60 The transnational criminal law paradigm’s problems, 
then, lie in its focus on the individual wrongdoer and not the 
economic motivations of migration. In this way, the criminal law 
paradigm fails to appropriately consider the labor dimensions of 
human trafficking and casts trafficked persons as hapless victims 
forced into extreme, violent conditions, instead of agents who 
have made choices, however limited, that have led to exploitative 
outcomes.61 A human rights approach has sought to address the 
shortcomings of the transnational criminal law paradigm with 
some success and some limitations. In the next section, I analyze 
this human rights perspective before returning to a particularly 
entrenched criminal perspective that demands more concerted 
attention: the equation of human trafficking with sex-sector 
human trafficking, which locates the wrong of human trafficking 
in gender violence. 
 
 55 See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Shamir, supra note 18, 
at 79 (“Yet despite this worldwide mobilization against human trafficking, the 
academic literature on anti-trafficking efforts has been largely critical of the emerging 
[criminal] legal paradigm.”). 
 56 See, e.g., Karen E. Bravo, Free Labor! A Labor Liberalization Solution to 
Modern Trafficking in Humans, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 550 (2009). 
 57 See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human 
Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5-6 (2008). 
 58 See, e.g., Shamir, supra note 18, at 105-06. 
 59 See, e.g., TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, SEX TRAFFICKING: A PRIVATE LAW RESPONSE 
1 (2013) (discussing the rarity of private law claims against traffickers). 
 60 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 57, at 5 (arguing that human trafficking 
laws, as presently configured, are “often convenient for (if not essential to) the project of 
globalized investment and trade”); Haynes, supra note 47, at 350 (arguing that practical, 
political, and theoretical concerns hinder U.S. efforts to protect trafficked persons). 
 61 See Haynes, supra note 47, at 373. 
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2. Human Trafficking as a Human Rights Issue 
In the wake of human trafficking’s criminalization, human 
rights advocates have struggled to infuse a human rights 
perspective into the dominant transnational criminal law 
paradigm.62 Instead of targeting perpetrators for punishment, 
human rights advocates seek a “victim friendly” global legal 
regime—one focused on and responsive to the needs and rights of 
trafficked persons themselves. In the words of legal scholar 
Allegra McLeod, “[a] human rights approach would emphasize 
prevention and care for those at risk of, or victim to, trafficking; it 
would not rely primarily on criminal law paradigms of innocent, 
‘iconic’ victims, and individual, culpable trafficker defendants.”63 
Human trafficking victims would, for instance, be understood to 
possess an untrammeled right to assistance—not one conditioned 
on their willingness or ability to cooperate with law enforcement in 
the prosecution of their traffickers.64 Forced repatriation would also 
be prohibited. McLeod’s argument illustrates the aspirational pull 
of human rights, where appeals in its name place the “human”—
undifferentiated, equal to all others—at the analytic center of the 
legal problem. 
If the aspirations of human rights law are laudable, critics 
argue that a human rights paradigm can nonetheless obscure the 
wrong of human trafficking.65 Like the transnational criminal  
 62 The early and vast gulf between the criminalization of human rights 
perspectives is practically a truism. Human rights provisions in the U.N. Trafficking 
Protocol do not mirror the language of obligation found in the criminalization provisions. 
Instead, states are only required—in “appropriate cases” and “to the extent possible 
under its domestic law”—to “consider” and “endeavor to undertake” assistance and 
protection for trafficked persons. See U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 345-47. 
 63 Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 83, 112 (2010). In fact, only one human rights obligation, the duty to furnish those 
subjected to human trafficking with access to a system to seek compensation, is 
mandatory. “Each State Party shall ensure that its domestic legal system contains 
measures that offer victims of trafficking in persons the possibility of obtaining 
compensation for damages suffered.” U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 345. 
 64 See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(l)(E)(i)(I) (2012) (requiring that prior to receiving 
assistance, the trafficked person “is willing to assist in every reasonable way in the 
investigation and prosecution of severe forms of trafficking in persons or is unable to 
cooperate with such a request due to physical or psychological trauma”); see also 
Haynes, supra note 47, at 345 (“The United States approaches its efforts to combat 
trafficking in human beings from a law enforcement perspective, with the justification 
for victim assistance emerging from the willingness and ability of victims to cooperate 
with law enforcement.”); Todres, supra note 16, at 150 (“In fact, the TVPA does not 
ensure victims’ rights to assistance but rather conditions assistance to certain victims 
on their willingness to cooperate with law enforcement in the prosecution of their 
traffickers. That is hardly a rights-based approach.” (citation omitted)). 
 65 See Shamir, supra note 18, at 80 (contending that “[f]ar from being 
marginalized, a human rights approach to trafficking constitutes an important element 
of the current global anti-trafficking campaign and has actually become part of the 
 
582 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2 
perspective that it seeks to correct, human rights approaches 
foreground individual harm and wrongdoing at the expense of 
broader analysis of the global market interactions that spawn 
human trafficking.66 As a result, human rights paradigms tend to 
provide a way of understanding human trafficking that may 
check the power of individual states or groups of states (targeting, 
for instance, the poor treatment of commercial sex workers by 
their traffickers), but may fail to reign in other arrangements of 
multistate or corporate power (as when human rights violations 
are marshaled in the service of ulterior economic interests or used 
to mask or justify outright land grabs and predatory wars).67 
What such criticism also illustrates is the potential for 
human rights and transnational criminal law/security approaches 
to converge—especially, as the next section details, in the name of 
gender justice. 
3. Human Trafficking as Gender Violence 
U.S. federal and state prosecutors have reported that 
definitional—and actively evolving—ambiguities in legal 
interpretations of human trafficking have fostered tremendous 
degrees of discretionary differentiation between acts that could, 
for example, easily be classified as either human trafficking or 
routine prostitution.68 If sex-sector human trafficking has suffered 
 
problem”); Hathaway, supra note 57, at 26 (arguing that “the antitrafficking campaign 
has also resulted in significant collateral human rights damage by providing a context 
for developed states to pursue a border control agenda under the cover of promoting 
human rights”); Wendy Chapkis, Trafficking, Migration, and the Law: Protecting 
Innocents, Punishing Immigrants, 17 GENDER & SOC’Y 6, 923 (2003) (analyzing how the 
TVPA facilitates anti-immigration policies at the expense of aiding trafficked persons); 
Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized Humanitarianism Meets Carceral Feminism: The 
Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Antitrafficking Campaigns, 36 
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULT. & SOC’Y 45 (2010) (arguing that anti-trafficking coalitions of 
Christian evangelical activists and some feminists prefer and have spurred a criminal 
justice approach to human trafficking that results in high rates of incarceration and 
enhanced border security).  
 66 See Shamir, supra note 18, at 95 (noting that “while human rights are 
concerned with the power of the individual relative to the state, labor rights have 
tended to be more collective oriented, focusing on the power of groups of workers 
(‘labor’) in relation to employers (‘capital’)”). 
 67 See Karen Engle, “Calling in the Troops”: The Uneasy Relationship Among 
Women’s Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
189, 189-90 (2007) (arguing that human rights and women’s rights are used to justify armed 
interventions contra traditional humanitarian goals); Vasuki Nesiah, From Berlin to Bonn 
to Baghdad: A Space for Infinite Justice, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 75, 76 (2004). 
 68 See, e.g., Brooke Grona-Robb, Prosecuting Human Traffickers, PROSECUTOR, 
Sept.-Oct. 2010 (explaining in part how some officers and prosecutors might see 
prostitution instead of human trafficking, and vice versa); Katy Steinmetz, Oakland 
Launches Pimp-Shaming Website, TIME (July 2, 2014), http://time.com/2946597/oakland-
launches-pimp-shaming-website [http://perma.cc/6LD4-2K7K] (describing an Oakland 
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from an overzealous inclusionary impulse, less severe forms of 
labor-sector human trafficking have been largely excluded from 
legal action or inquiry. The discretionary differentiation between 
human trafficking and non-sex-sector forms of labor exploitation 
has yet to be fully appreciated, analyzed, or theorized. This gap 
persists despite efforts to reorder the relationship between human 
trafficking and forced labor, complicating the definitional 
boundaries that delimit not only human trafficking and slavery, 
but also lesser exploitation and slavery. This gap persists in part 
due to the early and enduring framing of human trafficking as 
gender violence.69 
A gender violence paradigm construes the wrong of 
human trafficking specifically as one of violence against women. 
Crucially, this conceptualization of human trafficking is amenable 
to criminal law and human rights approaches and remedies, 
which tend to focus on punishing individual wrongdoers or 
enhancing individual rights, respectively. Both criminal law and 
human rights paradigms demand an enhanced state presence, if 
not the express involvement of an international governing order 
or transnational alliance of states, in curbing the occurrence of 
gendered sexual violence. It is therefore important to note that 
while gender violence could be addressed outside of the criminal 
justice system, in practice, charges of gender violence—largely 
understood as sexual violence and as violations of women’s 
human rights—are often couched in the language of criminal 
justice and trigger a criminal justice response.70 
A human rights approach therefore does not necessarily 
threaten, but rather can encourage, the recognition of sexual 
violence (if not all forms of human trafficking) as a crime that 
transverses domestic and international registers.71 Under a human 
rights paradigm, “women’s human rights” are increasingly 
 
police campaign that all but equated human trafficking with prostitution, whether 
coerced or chosen). 
 69 See, e.g., Chang & Kim, supra note 37, at 320-21 (arguing that enforcement 
agencies’ focus on sex trafficking neglects the larger trafficking phenomenon). 
 70 See, e.g., KIRSTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE 1-2 (2008) (analyzing 
how feminist efforts to end sexual violence have fostered a troubling alliance with the 
neoliberal state and criminal justice system); JEFFREY FAGAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 25-27 (1996), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf [http://perma.cc/YD9R-RZNZ] (detailing how 
the criminalization of domestic violence can fail to address its realities and arguing for 
the presence of informal or extralegal modes of redress). 
 71 See, e.g., Mary Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking, U.N. 
Doc. E/2002/68/Add. 1, at 3-4 (2002), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
Traffickingen.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6J4-JBU4]. 
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understood as gendered protections against violence, specifically 
sexual violence.72 The criminal law paradigm shares this view of 
sexuality as a person’s—especially a woman’s—intimate, private, 
and personal province where she alone is sovereign.73 This 
common take on sexuality’s centrality to individual, private self-
conceptualization underpins the moral ordering of the gender 
violence paradigm. This moral ordering then animates both a 
criminal law paradigm (wherein gendered human trafficking is 
an outrage to justice and an offense against the public) and a 
human rights paradigm (wherein gendered human trafficking is 
an affront to the rights of humanity, especially women). 
Certainly, on questions of enforcement and remedy, 
human rights and criminal law paradigms diverge on the 
question of how to best nurture and protect the private sexual 
self. The criminal law paradigm would ex post recruit the state 
to punish sexual threats. Conversely, in some ways the human 
rights paradigm would ex ante seek to augment the conditions 
that would allow for the private sexual self’s flourishing, 
urging an international order of states to adopt specific duties 
and obligations designed to foster those ends. But this 
divergence rests simply on the type of relationship between the 
law and the private sexual self. It does not deny the existence 
or primacy of a private sexual self, query the cultivation of a 
private sexual self as a key element of freedom, or question 
how or why “women’s human rights” as an abstract category 
became largely synonymous with efforts to protect a private 
sexual self instead of, for example, a public, economic one. 
What are the consequences that flow from understanding 
sex as wedded to a private, intimate self, and how do they affect 
how we theorize the wrong of human trafficking? Can one “own” 
one’s sexual self—is one’s sex market alienable—or is one 
 
 72 See, e.g., Rana Jaleel, Weapons of Sex, Weapons of War: Feminisms, Ethnic 
Conflict and the Rise of Rape and Sexual Violence in Public International Law During 
the 1990s, 27 CULTURAL STUD. 1 (2013). 
 73 This autonomy/bodily integrity/equality fusion is supported throughout 
constitutional case law and ties in to how we understand slavery. See infra Part V; see 
also Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal 
Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in 
Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 349 (2006) 
(describing how abolitionists argued “that prostitution necessarily constitutes a form of 
trafficking because it necessarily reproduces and enforces subordination of women by 
men”); Melissa Farley, Preface to PROSTITUTION, TRAFFICKING, AND TRAUMATIC STRESS 
xi, xiv (Melissa Farley ed., 2003); KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 
1 (1995); Dorchen Leidholdt, Prostitution: A Violation of Women’s Human Rights, 1 
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 133-37 (1993); Catharine MacKinnon, Prostitution and 
Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 28 (1993). 
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indistinguishable from it? Does one’s sexual self lie at the heart of 
one’s humanness, indivisible from it? 
These questions have persisted since the earliest human 
trafficking jurisprudence, which concerned the twentieth-
century obsession with “white slavery,” or the movement of 
women across borders for sexually exploitative purposes. In 
1904, the International Agreement for the Suppression of 
White Slave Traffic was adopted.74 Additional conventions were 
signed in 1910,75 1921,76 1933,77 and 1950.78 Each of these anti-
trafficking/anti-slavery initiatives were passed at historical 
moments when labor—particularly women’s labor and 
therefore also women’s social roles—were in great upheaval. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
industrialization and the movement of unsupervised working 
class girls into city factory work prompted anxieties about sexual 
propriety. The 1920s, 1930s, and 1950s also saw shifting labor 
demographics following economic turmoil and world war.79 The 
1990s, which kicked off our current human trafficking legal 
regime, witnessed a new phase of global labor migration and 
economic interdependency at the end of the Cold War.80 
This history suggests that human trafficking law has 
always attempted to mediate social concerns (particularly in the 
U.S. context) about what separates legitimate labor from acts of 
slavery—and has done so through the social category of gender. 
This millennium’s early U.S. prostitution reform debates, which 
dominated early human trafficking legal efforts,81 are no exception. 
At issue was the question of whether prostitution, including 
noncoerced or chosen prostitution, would be understood as sexual 
slavery and subsequently abolished, or as sex work subject to labor  
 74 International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 
May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83. 
 75 International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 
May 4, 1910, 98 U.N.T.S. 101. 
 76 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and 
Children, opened for signature Sept. 30, 1921, 53 U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force Mar. 
31, 1922). 
 77 International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of 
Full Age, Oct. 11, 1933, 150 L.N.T.S. 431. 
 78 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96 
U.N.T.S. 271 (entered into force July 25, 1951). 
 79 See MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING 
ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885-1920 (Linda K. Kerber & 
Nell Irvin Painter eds., 1995); SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR 
AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 65-66 (1991). 
 80 See SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW 186 (1990). 
 81 See, e.g., Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1657-58. 
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regulations and protections. Beneath the prostitution reform 
controversy lurk legal and intra-feminist disagreements on the 
broader relationships between gender, sex, labor, race, and the 
meaning of freedom, not to mention the scope and aptness of 
theorizing gender justice through violence. 
A gender violence approach to human trafficking has been 
especially pernicious given contemporary human trafficking law’s 
bifurcation of “sexual exploitation” from “labor exploitation.”82 
Singling out the sexual as a distinct category of exploitation has 
furthered the conflation of human trafficking with the gendered 
and sexualized victimization of women and children.83 This 
selective reading of human trafficking law downplays the 
prevalence of non-sex-sector trafficked workers while offering a 
vexed portrait of the relationship between women, sex, and 
violence that often silences the inquiry into whether “sex work” can 
be a consensual, chosen economic vocation—however limited the 
set of “choices” may be—instead of a criminal act.84 Moreover, a 
gender violence approach risks rendering men who are trafficked 
for commercial sex purposes invisible.85 It also creates a false divide 
between sex-sector trafficking and other forms of labor trafficking, 
all while erroneously masking the sizable sexual vulnerability of 
those who are trafficked into non-sex-sector forms of work.86 
These heated and protracted debates are significant and 
ongoing. Critical to any effort to distinguish the wrong of 
human trafficking, they implicate far more than the criminal 
law paradigm per se. They bear on what the labor migration 
paradigm conceives of as “labor,” the meaning of gender justice 
and human rights, as well as the legal meaning and social 
import of slavery. 
Sex work advocates, whether they champion prostitution 
and other commercial sex practices as viable career paths or 
ultimately strive to reduce or eradicate their occurrence, contend 
 
 82 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
 83 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 84 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 276-85 
(1999) (arguing that taking money in exchange for sexual services is analogous to 
other types of work). 
 85 See Tien, supra note 37. 
 86 See, e.g., GRACE MENG, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CULTIVATING FEAR: THE 
VULNERABILITY OF IMMIGRANT FARMWORKERS IN THE US TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0512
ForUpload_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q3EQ-3Z8L]; Amanda M. Kjar, U-Visa Certification 
Requirement is Blocking Congressional Intent Creating the Need for A Writ of Mandate 
and Training—Undocumented Immigrant Female Farmworkers Remain Hiding in the 
Fields of Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment, 22 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 141, 
142 (2013). 
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that such activities are work.87 In this view, those who perform 
such work deserve the full spectrum of labor protections that 
would accompany any other employment. A sex work approach to 
human trafficking understands its wrong in the language of 
labor—as unprotected, dangerous work often performed by 
women who may find themselves unable to find other gainful 
employment.88 Crucially, understanding the core wrong of human 
trafficking’s sexual exploitation element as materially similar to 
its labor exploitation element helps right the imbalance that pulls 
the lion’s share of legal attention towards sex-sector trafficking, 
rendering human trafficking all but synonymous with sexual 
exploitation. It can also correct for the gendered imbalance and 
moral judgment that often attends discussions of prostitution and 
other commercial sex acts by shifting attention away from the 
sexual self (whose alleged private nature is imminently 
debatable)89 and towards the structural economic realities faced 
by global low-wage workers. 
The continuities between a sex work approach and a 
broader labor migration paradigm are worth emphasizing, 
particularly in our current historical moment when labor and 
slavery paradigms are each paradoxically on the ascent. What the 
early human trafficking paradigms show is the continuous give 
and take between punishing wrongdoers whose actions injure 
humanity (the transnational criminal law paradigm), the shaping 
of a clearer notion of what protections humanity by birthright 
deserves (the human rights and gender justice paradigms), and 
the acknowledgement of the material conditions and economic 
frailties of workers (via a sex work/labor paradigm). From each 
vantage, the meaningfulness and role of consent as a marker of  
 87 It is important to see how the goals of human rights (to “preserve the 
visibility of the person as an individual” and emphasize freedom of choice) can dovetail 
with labor perspectives. See Halley et al., supra note 73, at 350. After all, labor rights are 
human rights. See Gallagher, supra note 32, at 847 (“From its earliest days to the 
present, human rights law has loudly proclaimed the fundamental immorality and 
unlawfulness of one person appropriating the legal personality, labor, or humanity of 
another.”). But a traditional labor paradigm does not place individual rights holders at 
the center of the legal problem. See Shamir, supra note 18, at 80 (“Individual and 
collective labor and employment rights emerged in the attempt to bring about structural 
changes to labor markets that would strengthen workers’ bargaining positions and, 
eventually, lead to the redistribution of wealth between capital and labor. They are, 
therefore, better suited than the traditional human rights tools for addressing the 
institutional aspects of the labor market exploitation on which trafficking is structured.”). 
 88 The ILO has taken tentative steps to recognize sex work as labor. See, e.g., 
ILO GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 196 (noting that forced labor occurs in private, 
where it is difficult to monitor and enforce labor law, and can involve commercial sex). 
 89 See Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex To Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139, 
1141 (1998) (arguing for an understanding of how the concept of sexuality functions 
socially that is not overly focused on private sexual identity or private sexual acts). 
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individual freedom assumes greater or lesser importance, 
depending on how each paradigm values individual choice versus 
structural or collective rights within its analysis of freedom. 
Unlike the transnational criminal law, human rights, and gender 
violence paradigms, the labor migration paradigm and the new 
low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm each understand labor 
market structures and poor employment conditions as underlying 
the wrong of human trafficking, thus moving away from an 
emphasis on individual choice or wrongdoing. 
II. THE LABOR MIGRATION PARADIGM OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Individual harms of equality and autonomy figure 
prominently in each of the dominant approaches to understanding 
the wrong of human trafficking. While human trafficking does 
undoubtedly cause individual people individual damage, 
centering the individual at the heart of an analysis of human 
trafficking is a grave error. An overt focus on individual harm 
obscures the structural conditions that drive human trafficking—
the inner workings of global labor markets and poor employment 
conditions that are not well regulated, if regulated at all. 
In recognition of the shortcomings of the dominant 
paradigmatic approaches to human trafficking, a labor perspective 
has recently emerged. This labor approach frames human 
trafficking as an issue of power, focusing ex ante on the structural 
imbalances that characterize work relationships in “labor sectors 
susceptible to [human] trafficking.”90 As labor law scholar Hila 
Shamir explains, to address the labor wrong of human trafficking, 
a labor paradigm “turns to strategies of collective action and 
bargaining, protective employment legislation, and contextual 
standard setting, in its attempt to remedy the unequal power 
relations in labor sectors susceptible to trafficking.”91 Such an 
approach would empower states and relevant international 
agencies to assume a strong and active role in regulating the legal 
backdrop against which global markets function.92 A labor 
approach also  
calls attention to other elements of the legal order that shape power 
relations in labor markets, such as the background rules of private law 
(including, for example, property, contracts, and torts), immigration 
regimes, relevant trade policies, criminal law, border-crossing practices, 
and certain welfare policies, to the extent that these elements of the  
 90 Shamir, supra note 18, at 81-82. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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legal order affect the bargaining positions of the parties to a labor 
contract in various labor sectors.93  
The emerging labor paradigm, however, has retained a focus on 
extreme migrant exploitation, splintering the full potential of 
human trafficking law. 
A. The Rise of a Labor Approach to Human Trafficking 
Suspending the question of whether prostitution should be 
abolished, decriminalized, or regulated like any other kind of 
work, a groundswell of noted legal scholars nonetheless agree: the 
early overemphasis on gendered sexual exploitation—be it 
through criminal law, human rights, gender violence, or gender 
equality paradigms—has overshadowed other forms of 
exploitation expressly targeted by human trafficking law, namely 
non-sex-sector labor exploitation.94 Recent U.S. and international 
human trafficking law and policy have mirrored this scholarly 
consensus, quietly steering anti-trafficking efforts beyond 
prostitution reform debates. In 2010, the Obama administration 
effectively reversed the Bush administration’s equation of 
voluntary prostitution with human trafficking. As the State 
Department’s 2010 TIP Report states, “Prostitution by willing 
adults is not human trafficking regardless of whether it is 
legalized, decriminalized, or criminalized.”95 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 See Dina Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation: The Thin Grey Legal Lines 
Between Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 1, 48 (2009) (criticizing the distinction between human trafficking and 
“ordinary” labor migration as a “false dichotomy”); Daryl Li, Offshoring the Army: 
Migrant Workers and the U.S. Military, 62 UCLA L. REV. 124 (2015) (noting the nascent 
prevalence of labor analyses of human trafficking while detailing the insufficiency of the 
TVPA to protect third-country national workers who are contracted by the U.S. military 
from extreme labor abuse); Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 6, at 611 (noting how 
recent interpretations of human trafficking law have made “the concept of labor itself 
explicitly relevant to a field that had long been narrowly focused on sexual exploitation”); 
Note, Counteracting the Bias: The Department of Labor’s Unique Opportunity to Combat 
Human Trafficking, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1012 (2013) [hereinafter, Counteracting the Bias] 
(arguing that human trafficking is increasingly understood as falling along a spectrum of 
abusive labor practices and detailing the Department of Labor’s mandate and renewed 
efforts to address human trafficking). 
 95 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 8 (2010). In 
contrast, see the 2004 U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, which views prostitution, 
voluntary or otherwise, as a correlate if not a cause of human trafficking, stating that 
“where prostitution has been legalized or tolerated, there is an increase in the demand 
for sex slaves.” BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: THE LINK 
BETWEEN PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING (2004), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/
ei/rls/38790.htm [http://perma.cc/VX6B-8GRH].  
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Meanwhile, the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
has attempted to exert new authority within human trafficking 
law through its close association with forced labor, a bailiwick 
of the ILO. In recognition of the prevalence of human 
trafficking and other “modern forms of slavery,” the ILO has 
recently adopted a new and legally binding Protocol to ILO 
Convention No. 29, the 1930 Forced Labour Convention.96 
Touted as “bring[ing] the existing ILO Convention [No.] 29 
Concerning Forced Labour . . . into the modern era” to address 
practices such as human trafficking, the Protocol “establishes a 
common framework for the 177 ILO member states that have 
ratified Convention [No.] 29.”97 
Specifically, the Protocol strengthens the international 
legal framework by creating new obligations to prevent forced 
labor, protect trafficked persons, and provide access to remedies—
including compensation—regardless of trafficked persons’ legal 
status.98 The Protocol encourages intergovernmental cooperation, 
including bilateral and multilateral agreements, to eradicate 
forced labor and human trafficking for the purposes of forced or 
compulsory labor.99 Crucially, the Protocol requires governments 
to take measures to better protect workers, particularly low-
skilled migrant workers, from fraudulent and abusive 
recruitment practices.100 
The ILO’s interest in human trafficking as a form of forced 
labor serves as a corrective to the organization’s notable absence 
in the discussions that culminated in the drafting and adoption of 
the U.N. Trafficking Protocol.101 The ILO’s involvement has 
 
 96 Int’l Labour Org., Text of the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, 
ILO Doc. 9A (June 11, 2014), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_246615.pdf [http://perma.cc/HH6Q-BKCR]. 
 97 Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., ILO Adopts New Protocol to Tackle Modern 
Forms of Forced Labour (June 11, 2014), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-
centre/press-releases/WCMS_246549/lang--en/index.htm [http://perma.cc/EN6R-JTAC]. 
 98 See Text of the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, supra note 
96, at 6-8. 
 99 Id. at 8. The ILO does not assume that all forced labor is human 
trafficking, noting that “[f]orced labour, contemporary forms of slavery, debt bondage 
and human trafficking are closely related terms though not identical in a legal sense. 
Most situations of slavery or human trafficking are however covered by ILO’s definition 
of forced labour.” The Meanings of Forced Labour, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/news/WCMS_237569/lang--en/index.htm 
[http://perma.cc/C48D-MEQ7]. 
 100 See Text of the Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, supra note 
96, at 6. 
 101 See, e.g., Director-General of the Int’l Labour Org., Stopping Forced Labour: 
Global Report Under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles 
and Rights of Work, 48, 100 (2001), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/-
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transformed the tenor of the legal debates over what human 
trafficking essentially is by portraying the wrong of human 
trafficking as a labor wrong and abandoning the Bush 
administration’s interpretive lens of gendered morality. While 
this nascent labor paradigm is an improvement, it is not without 
limitations. The ILO has managed to shift the focus of human 
trafficking debates only by building on the legal architecture of 
extant human trafficking law. That law, grounded in the logic of 
transnational crime, understands human trafficking in ways that 
collapse distinctions between consensual economic migration and 
the act of movement thought necessary to support a charge of 
human trafficking. While the Obama administration and the ILO 
thus recognize a labor wrong (among a muddle of others) at the 
heart of human trafficking, they adopt a specific species of labor 
as the object of their best efforts: migrant labor. 
B. Construing Labor as Migrant Labor 
The turn to migrant labor as the object of human 
trafficking law is also reflected in an emerging consensus among 
both labor and human trafficking legal scholars, who contend that 
a labor paradigm attuned to the vulnerabilities of migrant labor 
best recognizes and addresses the harms of human trafficking.102 
This paradigm casts human trafficking as largely the lot of the 
poor and the foreign who find themselves funneled into 
commercial sex work, construction, food service, home health 
care, agricultural work, or other forms of low-wage, poorly 
regulated labor with little recourse to the labor and employment 
protections enjoyed by native born or citizen workers.103 
To stem the tide of human trafficking, some scholars, 
like Hila Shamir, advocate for a general strengthening of the 
complex of laws (labor, criminal, and private) that affect 
structural relationships between employers and employees.104 
 
--dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_publ_9221119483_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/9
FQT-7VVY]. 
 102 See, e.g., Bravo, supra note 56, at 547; Shamir, supra note 18, at 79-80; 
Counteracting the Bias, supra note 94, at 1013.  
 103 The emphasis on migrant labor is due in part to a conflation of certain 
categories of work and the migrant status of the worker. For example, the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is often cited as a law that fails migrant workers because 
it defines the term “employee” to exclude in part “any individual employed as an 
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home.” 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). While agricultural and 
domestic workers do not categorically enjoy the protections of the NLRA, the Act makes 
no distinction between migrant and nonmigrant workers. Id. 
 104 See, e.g., Shamir, supra note 18, at 81-82. 
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Others, like labor and constitutional law expert James Gray 
Pope, suggest that the prohibition against “new slavery”105 
should incorporate support for “selected labor rights,” including 
the right to change employers, the right to bargain collectively, 
and the right to freedom of association, among others.106 Pope’s 
approach would help secure what legal scholar Karen Bravo 
calls “free labor” (or the ability of workers to freely alienate 
their labor across borders via a liberal trade and migration 
regime)107 in part by affording migrant workers the same 
protections provided to citizens.108 
Yet how recent interpretative changes in the conceptual 
meaning of human trafficking affect the operational parameters 
of human trafficking law is not assessed or explained in these 
works.109 Where human trafficking begins and lesser exploitation 
ends “remains hotly contested”110—especially with the absence of 
any movement requirement and the simultaneous reordering of 
all human trafficking as slavery. Setting the wrong of human 
trafficking as a low-wage/vulnerable labor one helps shift the 
parameters of human trafficking debates towards the free 
approach advanced by these scholars while integrating the labor 
conditions of native/citizen workers more firmly into analyses of 
exploitation—what it is and how it operates. 
As the prior analysis of the dominant paradigms shows, 
the act of movement or recruitment was at the outset considered 
uniquely critical in isolating and recognizing a specific population 
thought to be particularly vulnerable to exploitation, namely 
migrants or internally displaced persons. From the first, anti-
trafficking law targeted the harms and vulnerabilities associated 
with migration, aiming to protect the least protected persons for 
whom migrants served as the model: those people without or 
unable to access home state protections—people in flux. Debates 
 
 105 James Gray Pope, A Free Labor Approach to Human Trafficking, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2010); see also Bravo, supra note 56 (advocating for a “free 
labor” approach to human trafficking that eliminates barriers to migration and secures 
work protections for migrant laborers). 
 106 Pope, supra note 105, at 1853; see also Bravo, supra note 56, at 557. 
 107 Bravo, supra note 56, at 547 (arguing that “through the liberalization of 
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that the resuscitation of the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 might aid federal efforts to 
prosecute human trafficking). 
 110 Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1656-57. 
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about the movement requirement remained debates about how to 
best protect, first and foremost—if not exclusively—this at-risk 
population. As the ILO explained its adherence to the movement 
requirement, trafficked forced laborers “are probably even worse 
off than non-trafficked victims” who were thought to exercise 
greater degrees of agency and control over work conditions.111 
Recognizing that labor paradigm advocates have focused 
on migrant labor for legal, strategic, and ideological reasons 
illuminates how their position has not kept pace with 
transformations in how we interpret the elements necessary for a 
criminal or even civil charge of human trafficking. Other scholars 
have understood these developments as an “unmaking” of human 
trafficking law—as the destruction of the legal integrity of the 
crime of human trafficking.112 Instead, I view these shifts as 
indicative of the tension at the heart of the definition of human 
trafficking, inscribed within the codified split between labor and 
sexual exploitation, between economic and equality 
(nondiscrimination) interests, whose meanings are themselves 
predicated on the paradigms adopted for their interpretation. 
In this way, a labor migration paradigm—while 
undoubtedly promoting the collective rights of workers—
nevertheless carries within it an embedded equality argument 
rooted in group identity. It understands the rights of migrant 
workers as uniquely diminished within the global market. 
Migrant workers are not treated as equals to citizen workers, 
who are understood as largely protected by domestic law and 
able to enjoy access to shared sociocultural resources. This 
dichotomized view of labor exploitation casts migrant worker 
treatment as an affront to a liberal notion of freedom premised 
on equality, while the low-wage/vulnerable work conditions 
that engender worker exploitation regardless of citizenship 
status remain outside legal attention. 
Understanding the wrong of human trafficking as a labor 
wrong that predominantly befalls migrant workers allows us to 
see several significant harms that criminal law, human rights, 
and assorted gender paradigms obscure. By framing human 
trafficking as a migrant labor issue, the labor migration paradigm 
 
 111 Beate Andrees & Mariska N.J. van der Linden, Designing Trafficking 
Research from a Labour Market Perspective: The ILO Experience, 43 INT’L MIGRATION 
55, 64-65 (2005) (explaining the ILO’s position during the U.N. Trafficking Protocol 
negotiations). The ILO’s current position regarding the relationship between human 
trafficking and forced labor is currently much more nuanced. See infra Section IV.C. 
 112 See Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1706-08; Counteracting 
the Bias, supra note 94, at 1015-16. 
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foregrounds the movement of workers of all genders and 
persuasions across borders or to otherwise nonnative locales. 
Doing so reveals the vulnerabilities and interdependencies that 
inhere in the human condition113—particularly human working 
conditions—while retaining a focus on the unique vulnerabilities 
of those who work beyond the borders of their homeland or place 
of origin. A labor migration paradigm thus offers a particular 
portrait of the inner workings of power—one where the struggle 
lies in perfecting the balance of power between citizen and 
noncitizen labor arrangements, specifically in sectors thought to 
be vulnerable to human trafficking. 
Unqualified comparison between all migrant work and 
all work performed by a state’s citizenry, however, may not be 
the best metric for producing sound law or policy. Differences 
across work sectors, industries, and job categories may 
complicate categorical claims that migrant workers are 
necessarily more exploited than other workers, particularly 
when the legal threshold for exploitation may be met by both 
forced and psychologically coerced labor, as well as deceptive or 
fraudulent recruitment practices that may cumulatively rise to 
the level of actionable exploitation. Is the wrong of human 
trafficking, then, best described through an unremitting, if not 
legally prescribed, focus on migrant labor? What harms would be 
made visible if states understood migrant labor in ways that also 
assessed the conditions of low-wage work more broadly, without 
recourse to worker citizenship status as an unacknowledged 
template for the violation? In other words, how would we 
understand the wrong of human trafficking if we reframed 
human trafficking debates as issues of domestic low-
wage/vulnerable work and employment conditions? 
Before turning to an exploration of the new low-
wage/vulnerable labor paradigm, it is worth noting how the 
increasing willingness to recognize and address non-sex-sector 
labor exploitation as legally actionable human trafficking has 
been accompanied by a tendency to de-emphasize any movement 
requirement and instead spotlight exploitation as the core 
harm.114 Theoretically, this should push against the notion that 
 
 113 Fineman, supra note 12, at 8-12. 
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The core of human trafficking is exploitation; trafficking does not necessarily 
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anti-trafficking efforts should focus almost exclusively on migrant 
exploitation. Yet the assumption that trafficked labor is largely, if 
not exclusively, migrant labor lingers within legal descriptions of 
human trafficking, even though the scope of anti-trafficking law is 
less than ever limited to migrants. In other words, with the 
affirmative absence of any movement requirement, the abuse that 
constitutes actionable exploitation has been legally sundered from 
its foundational motivation: the vulnerability of migrant workers 
to various forms of organized exploitation perpetrated by 
international criminal syndicates. 
What persists, however, are the old ties of movement, 
migrancy, and criminality. To illustrate this claim, the following 
sections describe the impact of eliminating the movement 
requirement on legal interpretations of human trafficking law. 
These sections also explore how the transnational criminal 
paradigm has conflated migrancy and movement with the harm 
of trafficking in ways that keep extant labor critiques from 
looking beyond severe (migrant) exploitation and towards lesser 
exploitations also prohibited by law that impact migrant and 
nonmigrant workers alike. Part of the exclusion of lesser labor 
exploitation from analyses of human trafficking turns on the 
equation of movement with migrancy and vulnerability, and 
simultaneously, citizenship with access. 
III. FUSING MOVEMENT AND MIGRATION 
The focus on migrant labor has occurred even as the TIP 
Office has eliminated the movement requirement, demonstrating 
that the kind of isolation and lack of access to resources or 
remedies that characterizes human trafficking is not solely 
achieved by being physically moved, either across a border or 
within a state. A fusion of movement and migration as equivalent 
bad acts that befall human trafficking victims has resulted in case 
law that has been unable to capture the less severe forms of labor 
exploitation otherwise included in anti-trafficking law. Indeed, an 
understanding of movement as a prerequisite for a charge of 
human trafficking relies on an inaccurate perspective of the 
conditions of both migrancy and low-wage work. 
 
the workplace, and violate labor and safety laws with impunity because of 
weak laws and weak employer enforcement efforts.” 
Counteracting the Bias, supra note 94, at 1014 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Leticia M. Saucedo, 
A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 
893 (2008)); see, e.g., 2012 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 9, at 13-14.  
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A. The Elimination of the Movement Requirement and the 
Meaning of Exploitation 
The TIP Office’s disavowal of any movement requirement 
is noteworthy as the United States broadens its focus on non-sex-
sector labor exploitation. To satisfy the “act” element in the 
absence of a movement requirement, the TIP Office has adopted 
expansive interpretations of the enumerated act elements, 
including “harboring,” “receipt,” and “obtaining.” The Obama 
administration understands these acts alone as sufficient to 
support a charge of human trafficking—no movement or 
recruitment by a third party is required. In this way, prior 
distinctions between trafficked and nontrafficked forced labor have 
conceptually crumbled, allowing the Obama administration to 
subsume all forced labor within the ambit of human trafficking.115 
Moreover, in the absence of a movement requirement, the 
exploitation element takes on new significance in ways that 
transform the relationship between the three elements (act, 
means, and purpose) of the crime. With “exploitation” as an 
element, early interpretations of the TVPA and the U.N. Human 
Trafficking Protocol were not understood to contain an explicit 
mandate to end human sexual or labor exploitation—they were 
thought of instead as “process orient[ed]” proscriptions.116 These 
instruments were construed as singling out only certain acts that 
engender exploitation for legal action. In other words, they only 
prohibit specific forms of dealing (“the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons” per the 
U.N. Trafficking Protocol,117 and “the recruitment, harboring, 
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person” per the TVPA) 
in which people are exploited through force, fraud, or coercion.118 
Now that exploitation and not movement has become 
central to the TIP Office’s interpretation of human trafficking,119 
the relationship between the act and purpose elements of human 
trafficking has changed. With the act of movement that once 
underpinned the meaning of “recruitment, harboring, 
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person” removed, 
exploitation itself takes center stage. In New York City, for 
instance, where state trafficking laws are not interpreted to 
 
 115 See Chuang, Exploitation Creep, supra note 6, at 610-11. 
 116 See Hathaway, supra note 57, at 9-11. 
 117 U.N. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 3, at 344. 
 118 See TVPA, supra note 2. 
 119 See 2012 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 9, at 13-14. 
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require movement,120 this has resulted in prosecutions of 
employers who exploit migrant workers who have already been 
in the country for some time—a fact pattern that was not always 
thought to constitute human trafficking.121 
As a result of this interpretation, anti-trafficking 
instruments no longer function as strict process-oriented 
proscriptions. Instead, they now fall in line with anti-trafficking 
campaigns that aim to “end modern slavery.” This, then, is the 
point where the TIP Office’s move (1) to classify all forced labor as 
human trafficking and (2) to view all human trafficking as 
slavery, with all its populist abolitionary appeal, converge—in an 
effort to move from much-critiqued “process oriented 
proscriptions” to wholesale attempts to end exploitation. 
A closer analysis of the relevance of movement to the 
recognition of human trafficking is illustrative in this regard. 
How human trafficking law has understood migration in relation 
to the movement requirement has led to problems in how the law 
identifies acts of human trafficking for both migrant and 
nonmigrant workers. This in turn affects how the meaning and 
significance of migration, and therefore movement, shifts with the 
paradigms applied to human trafficking law—even if these shifts 
in meaning have been largely unacknowledged. 
B. A Critique of the Movement Requirement 
1. Mistaking Migration as the Harm 
The wisdom of requiring movement—not to mention 
what sort of movement counts (transborder or intrastate) or 
when the movement had to occur in order to count—has long 
been a subject of debate. Paradigmatic shifts in interpreting, 
applying, and enforcing human trafficking law have driven, 
among other things, the debates over the significance of 
movement to human trafficking. The debates over movement are 
in essence debates about what causes the underlying conditions 
that create and foster exploitation and what those underlying 
conditions actually are. The early transnational criminal law 
understanding of human trafficking has led to the notion that 
migration in and of itself is a harmful act, which has inhibited 
 
 120 See Human Trafficking, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., 
http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/humantraffic/ [http://perma.cc/Q8Z5-M8ED] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
 121 Suzanne Tomatore & Laura Matthews-Jolly, Spotlight on 150 Human 
Trafficking Cases, CITY B. JUST. CTR. (2013), http://www.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/
images/stories/pdfs/cbjc-iwc-human-trafficking.pdf [http://perma.cc/2M2G-95SH]. 
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the law’s ability to recognize the full range of acts prohibited by 
our primary anti-trafficking instruments. 
In the context of the transnational criminal law paradigm, 
migration and victimhood are closely entwined. The U.N. Human 
Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA conceive of human trafficking 
as a critical security issue deeply tied to transnational organized 
crime syndicates that facilitate clandestine, often illicit, migration 
and that primarily target women and children.122 As a result, for 
U.S. courts, trafficked persons’ vulnerability is often tied to their 
assumed status as unwitting victims far from home.123 
Definitional ambiguities in the U.N. Trafficking Protocol 
fostered first-stage debates on whether the crime of human 
trafficking necessitated transborder movement, either across 
state borders or within a single state. Indeed, equivocation over 
the meaning of movement or recruitment is tied to the 
conceptualization of the wrong. While authors and advocates of 
the U.N. Trafficking Protocol initially understood the movement 
requirement as essential to any transnational legal definition of 
human trafficking,124 others questioned the effectiveness of this 
approach. The issue of whether or not the U.N. Human Trafficking 
Protocol named the internal recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring, or receipt of persons within a single state as actionable 
human trafficking fueled accusations that the human trafficking 
legal regime “while billed as key to the modern fight against 
slavery, has actually promoted a very partial perspective on the 
problem of modern slavery.”125 
Assurances and clarifications on the legal meaning of 
human trafficking soon followed. Subsequent regional and 
state laws that explicitly included intrastate movement within 
the auspices of human trafficking ultimately quelled debates 
about intrastate movement.126 Yet the issue of the relationship 
 
 122 See supra Part I. 
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between movement and human trafficking is not put to rest 
even with the express inclusion of intrastate movement as an 
act that can trigger human trafficking liability. This enduring 
tension is arguably attributable to the worry that migration, 
often equated with forced movement—and not the labor 
structures and employment conditions into which migrants 
relocate—is itself the core harm. Early debates on the scope of 
human trafficking law and the meaning of human trafficking 
demonstrate the slippage between migration, movement, and 
this understanding of the wrong of human trafficking. 
On January 29, 1998, a roundtable on “The Meaning of 
‘Trafficking in Persons’: A Human Rights Perspective” was held 
in Washington, D.C., by the International Human Rights Law 
Group. Convened by the Women’s Rights Advocacy Program 
(WRAP) of the International Human Rights Law Group with 
the assistance of the Harvard Law School Human Rights 
Program, participants included human rights activists, 
scholars, and professionals, who sought to end the human 
rights abuses of human trafficking and hone a precise working 
definition of “human trafficking.”127 All present roundly rejected 
any border-crossing requirement, be it international, national, 
state, or intrastate, noting that “the harm to victims can be the 
same whether they are moved two miles across a national 
border or 1,000 miles within national boundaries.”128 For those 
present, certain “factors” associated with border crossing—not 
the physical act of crossing a border itself—lay at the heart of 
human trafficking. The factors generated and agreed upon by 
roundtable participants included “movement to a foreign or 
unfamiliar milieu; victims having illegal or non-national 
status; language, cultural or other barriers; and separation 
from family and community.”129 Nonetheless, roundtable 
participants still deemed it “unfitting and inappropriate that a 
change in status or conditions without any physical transport, 
movement or travel should qualify as [human] trafficking.”130 
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The rationales for this declaration are not elaborated in 
the record. What this assertion and omission indicate is the 
degree to which migration itself is viewed as a harmful act. Here, 
movement or migration becomes an act instigated (or enabled) by 
a wrongdoer that is both evidence of wrongdoing and is itself a 
kind of harm—a direct result of approaching human trafficking 
through a transnational criminal law framework. 
This slippage between the movement requirement, 
migration, and the harm of human trafficking is on full display in 
early efforts to distinguish human trafficking from human 
smuggling.131 While the definition of human trafficking turns on 
the existence of forceful, coercive, or fraudulent dealings that lead 
to sexual or labor exploitation, human smuggling has been 
historically understood as “a consensual and relatively benign 
market-based response to the existence of laws that seek 
artificially to constrain the marriage of surplus labor supply on 
one side of a border with unmet demand for certain forms of labor 
on the other side of that border.”132 The transnational 
criminalization of human trafficking, however, revivified and 
entrenched aggressive state border securitization and policing 
strategies, resulting in the attendant criminalization of human 
smuggling. The U.N. Trafficking Protocol and its parent 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime133 sought to 
facilitate interstate cooperation to stamp out human trafficking, 
intercept traffickers, and control borders through standardized 
practices such as information exchange, mutual legal assistance, 
and repatriation procedures.134 
By ignoring the market dynamics that put workers’ bodies 
in migratory motion and framing efforts to work and survive as 
illicit criminal enterprises, the transnational criminalization of 
human smuggling is in essence the transnational criminalization 
of a market-responsive labor practice.135 Economic migration and 
the act of movement necessary for a charge of human trafficking 
were thus conceptually fused and, as such, became the targets of 
anti-trafficking law. As a result, subsequent attempts to correct 
 
 131 Prohibited human smuggling entails “the procurement, in order to obtain, 
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for the excesses of the transnational criminal law paradigm 
retained a heavy, if not exclusive, focus on migrant labor. 
This emphasis all but removed the nonmigrant workers 
whose conditions of work might trigger a charge of human 
trafficking from legal attention and analysis. The weighty 
charge of transnational criminality ensured a focus on more 
extreme forms of exploitation, keeping lesser exploitations 
prohibited by anti-trafficking law beyond legal purview. Perhaps 
most critically, the construal of migration as a harm in and of 
itself has helped preclude critical analyses of how duties and 
responsibilities are allocated between employers and employees. 
In other words, the broad nature of the work relationship has 
often been obscured by a too-narrow focus on the legal status of 
the worker and the attendant, misguided assumption that the 
harm, and in fact the wrong of human trafficking, lies in the act 
of movement/migration itself. 
2. Rethinking the Relationship Between Movement, 
Migration, and Harm 
When migration is recognized as value neutral, as 
potentially chosen and compelled by a desire to find work, even 
“bad” work, the legal significance of movement changes. 
Movement becomes a cipher for a social or structural lack of 
access to resources or options instead of something imposed or 
instigated by bad actors on unwitting victims. Movement 
becomes a proxy, in other words, for isolation, not simply forced 
migration. Indeed, when confronted with the choice to seek 
protection as victims of human trafficking or portray themselves 
as workers fighting for their rights, RESPECT, a network of 
European migrant domestic workers whose acronym stands for 
“Rights Equality Solidarity Power Europe Co-operation 
Today,”136 rejected the human trafficking framework, which they 
felt compromised their efforts to overcome “the feeling of 
powerlessness among the migrants” and failed to promote “the 
regularization of undocumented migrants as workers.”137 In 
understanding irregular or illegal labor migration as integral to 
 
 136 Women Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe are Contributing to European 
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http://www.respectnetworkeu.org/ [http://perma.cc/SM7J-AW8S] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
 137 Helen Schwenken, “Domestic Slavery” Versus “Workers Rights”: Political 
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the global economy, they further alleged that the mainstream 
legal fight against human trafficking “delegitimize[s] and even 
destroy[s] safer mechanisms of irregular migration.”138 
If the differing relationships between migration, 
movement, and vulnerability seem subtle, they are nonetheless 
significant in legal diagnoses of human trafficking. As the 
members of RESPECT attest, vulnerability does not stem from 
migration, even irregular migration. Rather, it emerges from 
within the larger labor and immigration structures in which it 
occurs, if not the strictures of human trafficking law itself, when 
it is interpreted as a process-oriented proscription that focuses 
legal attention on some kinds of exploitation but not others. In 
other words, it is the failure to enact and enforce basic labor 
protections and employment laws that creates vulnerability and 
isolation, not the act of migration or movement itself. 
Thinking through what differentiates trafficked forced 
labor from nontrafficked forced labor evinces this point. For 
example, to explain its early adherence to the movement 
requirement, the ILO relied on the notion that trafficked forced 
laborers are “probably even worse off than non-trafficked 
victims,” who were thought to exercise greater degrees of 
agency and control over work conditions.139 This distinction, 
however, is not persuasive. 
First, there is a temporal issue with the way that 
trafficked and nontrafficked forced labor has been differentiated. 
It is fairly noncontroversial that a migrant worker who is 
smuggled across a border and/or recruited by an agency or other 
intermediary into a textbook forced labor situation, where the 
worker’s wages are withheld and the worker is compelled to labor 
under threat of violence, would be considered a victim of human 
trafficking. Indeed, second only to sex-sector human trafficking, 
this is the classic human trafficking scenario.140 If, however, a 
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migrant worker is recruited by an agency, works for a period of 
months without incident, changes employers, and is then subject 
to the same sort of exploitation, should this count as human 
trafficking? Is the worker’s migrant status the primary source of 
vulnerability? Or is it the working conditions that are at issue? 
This scenario is far from a mere hypothetical. As mentioned 
previously, in New York City, where state laws expressly disavow 
movement as a requirement for human trafficking, the New York 
City Bar Justice Center’s Immigrant Women and Children Project 
(IWC) reports that such is the case with many of their clients.141 
This example demonstrates how, with the abandonment of the 
movement requirement, legal interpretations of human trafficking 
law are coming closer to understanding the wrong of human 
trafficking as a labor and employment wrong that may befall 
migrant or nonmigrant workers—even if this is currently 
underacknowledged and underexplored. When nothing in either 
the U.N. Trafficking Protocol or the TVPA limits their application 
to migrant workers, what but an unexamined fusion between 
migrancy and vulnerability—one that crowds out a robust 
examination of nonmigrant worker vulnerability—can account for 
the current conceptual approach to human trafficking, which treats 
labor exploitation as almost exclusively a migrant labor problem?142 
The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm begins a 
conversation to remedy these issues. In recognizing human 
trafficking’s wrong as a new low-wage/vulnerable labor one, the 
intuitive meaning of the movement requirement is preserved—
namely, the vulnerability of living dislocated from institutional 
or social redress. Instead of rigorously inhering in the act of 
movement, however, isolation might also be achieved through 
the accumulation of poor working conditions and the lack of 
meaningful avenues of redress, which, as the U.S. context 
shows, affects migrant and nonmigrant workers alike, albeit to 
varying degrees. 
 
origin discrimination claims for the hiring of East Indian migrant workers for 
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 141 Tomatore & Matthews-Jolly, supra note 121 (noting that “[m]igration and 
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 142 See Andrees & van der Linden, supra note 111, at 64 (“[S]ince both those 
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This is not to suggest that “forced labor [should] be 
equated simply with low wages or poor working conditions . . . [or] 
situations of pure economic necessity, as when a worker feels 
unable to leave a job because of the real or perceived absence of 
employment alternatives.”143 Rather, the new low-wage/vulnerable 
labor paradigm is a first step towards recognizing the 
unacknowledged breadth of our contemporary anti-trafficking 
instruments. Crucially, the new paradigm is no lofty theoretical 
imposition, but rather is an analytic synthesis of new legal 
interpretations of the elements of human trafficking and social 
scientific research. Both advocate for more frequent and sustained 
legal attention to labor exploitation and working conditions in the 
context of human trafficking. For these reasons, the new low-
wage/vulnerable labor paradigm best describes the core wrong of 
human trafficking. 
IV. A THIN LINE: HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE NEW LOW-
WAGE/VULNERABLE LABOR PARADIGM 
The preceding sections provide two new, fundamental 
insights about the current legal approach to human trafficking: 
(1) dominant paradigms fail to capture the full range of acts 
prohibited by human trafficking’s primary legal instruments; and 
(2) even the emerging labor approach, which does a better job of 
describing the wrong of human trafficking than the criminal law, 
gender violence, or human rights paradigms, hamstrings the full 
potential of human trafficking law through the unacknowledged 
use of migrant labor as a template for understanding human 
trafficking. The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm not only 
addresses the shortcomings of prior efforts to interpret human 
trafficking law but is also consistent with attempts to construe 
human trafficking law as mandating the end of exploitation. 
A. Human Trafficking as a Low-Wage/Vulnerable Labor 
Problem 
The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm proposes 
that the wrong of human trafficking may lie in the nature of low-
wage work itself, depending on how we as a society choose to 
configure the relationship between equality, labor, and freedom. 
In this spirit, I use the word “vulnerable” in an inclusionary way. 
“Vulnerable” can both describe precarious low-wage labor and 
 
 143 See ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009, supra note 15, at 5. 
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encompass acts that are not paid a wage or recognized as work 
(including, in many cases, prostitution or other commercial sex 
acts). Recourse to vulnerability theory also emphasizes how a 
worker’s susceptibility to exploitation is both context specific and 
inherent in the human condition. As new sociological scholarship 
reveals, “[w]orkplace violations are not limited to immigrant 
workers or other vulnerable groups in the labor force—everyone is 
at risk, although to different degrees.”144 With this understanding, 
I reference vulnerability, following Martha Albertson Fineman, as 
a methodological commitment to analyzing structural and 
institutional distributions of advantage and disadvantage that 
exceed a discrimination-based model’s narrow focus on individual 
identity.145 In the present case, vulnerability theory compels an 
analysis of human trafficking that looks beyond legal status 
designations (i.e., citizenship) to interrogate the broader 
institutional and social arrangements that put people at risk. 
Vulnerability theory complements recent labor law 
scholarship that aims to make the law responsive and reflective of 
the changing nature of work in a globalized economy. This 
scholarship reconceptualizes the foundations of labor law by basing 
the extension of social protections on labor-force membership 
status—not the employment relationship. Alain Supiot takes this 
position, locating labor-force membership status in work, which 
differs from activity because work “results from an obligation, 
whether voluntarily undertaken or compulsorily imposed.”146 
Foregrounding the wrong of human trafficking in this way 
captures the full range of offenses proscribed by human 
trafficking law, from labor performed pursuant to enslavement to 
deceptive or coercive exploitation. It does so by understanding 
that the wrong that binds this range of exploitative practices is a 
collective wrong that inheres in the inner workings of global labor 
markets and manifests in employment conditions. 
To flesh out these potentials, the following section 
contrasts a recent report describing low-wage work conditions in 
the United States with a 2009 ILO Global Report authored in 
conjunction with the European Union. The ILO Global Report is 
an attempt to capture more legally actionable incidents of human 
trafficking—albeit with a specific focus on migrant labor. In the 
same spirit, 2009 also witnessed the release of a Delphi method 
 
 144 BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 21, at 5. 
 145 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 146 See ALAIN SUPIOT, BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE 
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survey, implemented by the ILO and the European Commission, 
identifying operational indicators used to diagnose the presence of 
human trafficking. The report departs from a definition of human 
trafficking as tantamount solely to slavery. Instead, it focuses on 
how to recognize less extreme versions of human trafficking, 
listing combinations of acts or violations that alone would not 
suggest its occurrence, but that together offer a vision of human 
trafficking as a cumulative accretion of workplace violations. 
Here, the trafficked person at issue belies the iconic image of the 
shackled sex slave or other worker trapped and forced to labor in 
slave-like conditions. Instead, the trafficked person more closely 
resembles someone trapped in the low-wage labor market. 
Read in tandem, these two reports demonstrate the need 
for a thorough reconceptualization of the wrong of human 
trafficking as a baseline for developing targeted and effective 
action against it. This can be accomplished by recognizing how 
latent equality arguments are embedded within a labor migration 
paradigm in ways that draw a false distinction between trafficked 
migrant labor and other low-wage and vulnerable work. This 
division, while preserving the legal integrity of a vision of human 
trafficking defined by force, violence, and slavery, may in fact 
generate anti-trafficking efforts that fail to address “less 
extreme,” but equally proscribed forms of human trafficking—or 
worse, actively contribute to their flourishing. 
B. Cumulative Labor Violations as Human Trafficking 
In “A Labor Paradigm for Human Trafficking,” Hila 
Shamir states that the majority of scholars and activists agree 
that a “certain ‘seriousness’ threshold” must be reached before a 
detrimental employment practice may be deemed human 
trafficking.147 And yet the threshold requirements are anything 
but clear: “uncertainty remains as to what exactly constitutes 
[human] trafficking.”148 Anne T. Gallagher concurred, noting that 
beyond this seriousness threshold, “the lines [delineating human 
trafficking] remain blurred.”149 The ambiguity surrounding what 
constitutes exploitation, as well as the porousness of the means 
element of the definition, have each contributed to the definitional 
imprecisions of human trafficking. 
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Nevertheless, Shamir and others understand the means 
elements to have accrued certain content by experience and 
application in international and national contexts. In other 
words, the meaning of human trafficking has been determined 
by practice and experience—not necessarily through recourse 
to the plain language of the U.N. Trafficking Protocol or in 
accordance with its drafters’ intentions. Thus, as James Gray 
Pope notes, “physical coercion is decidedly not a threshold 
requirement for a practice to constitute human trafficking—
other, less robust forms of intimidation have proven sufficient.”150 
Hila Shamir specifically observes that “[w]ithholding wages or 
identification papers, continually threatening to expose a worker’s 
undocumented status to authorities, and using indebted labor 
(bonded labor or indentured labor)151 are all understood to satisfy 
the means element.”152 
Relatedly and quite crucially, human trafficking may also 
arise in situations where workers have consented to travel for 
work—abduction and deception over the type and conditions of 
work are not the sole actions proscribed by human trafficking 
law.153 Instead, human trafficking can occur not only when the 
type of work one is compelled to engage in differs from what was 
promised, but also when the worker has not consented to the 
working conditions themselves. Long working hours, illicit or 
excessive wage deductions, delayed payment, low wages, and 
restrictions on freedom of movement may all support a charge of 
human trafficking.154 Deceptive recruitment is not, therefore, 
perceived as essential to the violative essence of human 
trafficking. Instead, human trafficking emerges as “a combination 
of labor rights violations, where each one alone might not amount 
to [human] trafficking.”155 Under this configuration, a worker’s 
migrant status may contribute to vulnerability, but does it  
 150 Pope, supra note 105. 
 151 Debt bondage is 
the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal 
services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the 
value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the 
liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not 
respectively limited and defined. 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery art. 1(a), 266 U.N.T.S. 3, 41 (Sept. 7, 1956). 
 152 Shamir, supra note 18, at 86-87 (footnotes omitted). 
 153 See, e.g., Kathy Richards, The Trafficking of Migrant Workers: What Are 
the Links Between Labour Trafficking and Corruption?, 42 INT’L MIGRATION 147, 154 
(2004); Shamir, supra note 18, at 87; Gallagher, supra note 32, at 811-12. 
 154 Shamir, supra note 18, at 87. 
 155 Id.; ILO GLOBAL REPORT 2009, supra note 15, at 13. 
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describe the core wrong of human trafficking? Perhaps instead 
the wrong is rooted in the employment conditions themselves. 
C. The ILO’s Operational Indicators of Trafficking in 
Human Beings 
The 2009 “Operational Indicators of Trafficking in Human 
Beings,” discussed fully in the ILO 2009 Global Report, originated 
in a joint ILO and European Commission project to “reach 
consensus among European experts on what indicators should be 
used to characterize the various elements of the definition of 
[human] trafficking for data collection purposes.”156 The project 
employed the Delphi method. Developed in the 1950s and widely 
adopted throughout the social, medical, and political sciences, this 
methodology produces results based on the consensus of a wide-
ranging group of experts.157 In notable contrast to other methods 
of data gathering and analysis, the Delphi method operates 
through a feedback process conducted in a series of rounds. In 
each round, participants fill out questionnaires that the primary 
researcher then collects and edits. Prior to the next round, the 
researcher returns to each participant “a summation of comments 
[to make] each participant aware of the range of opinions and the 
reasons underlying those opinions.”158 The returned comments are 
offered anonymously. As Chia Chien Hsu and Brian A. Sanford 
observe, “in a Delphi study, the results of previous iterations 
regarding specific statements and/or items can change or be 
modified by individual panel members in later iterations based on 
their ability to review and assess the comments and feedback 
provided by the other Delphi panelists.”159 The Delphi method 
thus offers several unique advantages over conventional means of 
assessing group opinion, including the “ability to provide 
anonymity to respondents, a controlled feedback process,” and the 
minimization of the typical pitfalls of group dynamics, mainly 
group pressure to achieve conformity.160 
 
 156 ILO OPERATIONAL INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 15, at 2. 
 157 Chia-Chien Hsu & Brian A. Sandford, The Delphi Technique: Making 
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In the ILO/European Commission human trafficking 
project, the surveyed experts hailed from 27 European Union 
states and included representatives of the judiciary, the police, 
the government, and academic and research institutes, as well 
as representatives from NGOs, international organizations, 
labor inspectorates, and trade unions. Each expert completed 
two successive surveys. The first identified indicators of human 
trafficking; the second rated the strength of those indicators. 
This report was not only an attempt to standardize 
definitions of human trafficking and the meaning of relevant labor 
exploitation across Europe, but was also part of a broader effort to 
“strengthen[ ]  freedom, security and justice in the EU” by 
(i) establishing cooperation between Member States and others in the 
implementation of the EU strategy to measure crime and criminal 
justice; (ii) identifying the policy needs for data on crime and criminal 
justice; and iii) identifying the needs for—and/or developing—common 
indicators and tools designed to measure crime and criminal justice.161 
In fact, the ILO/European Commission project was itself a 
subgroup housed within an expert group requested by the 
European Council’s Hague Program and convened by the 
European Commission to assess the European Union’s need for 
data on crime and criminal justice. In this way, the enduring 
transnational criminal law paradigm subtly structures what 
labor perspectives may most readily graft onto human 
trafficking law: a labor perspective focused on migrant labor. 
Such a perspective commandeers labor issues and wraps them 
in the veil of state security, perceiving migrant labor (abuse) as 
a threat to state sovereignty. And yet the operational indicators 
describing trafficked work that emerge from the joint report do 
not only characterize the kinds of work conditions suffered by 
migrant workers in Europe—they also describe large swaths of 
the U.S. landscape of low-wage work.162 
The Delphi method yielded four sets of operational 
indicators: one each for adult labor and sexual exploitation, and 
one each for child labor and sexual exploitation. Each set is a 
structured list of indicators that together reveal six dimensions of 
human trafficking: (1) deceptive recruitment or deception during 
recruitment, transfer, and transportation (10 indicators);163 (2)  
 161 ILO OPERATIONAL INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 15, at 2. 
 162 See infra Section IV.D; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 163 The sole “[s]trong indicator” of deceptive recruitment for adult labor 
exploitation is being “[d]eceived about the nature of the job, location or employer.” 
“Medium indicators” include “[d]eceived about the conditions of work”; “[d]eceived about 
content or legality of work contract”; “[d]eceived about family reunification”; “[d]eceived 
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coercive recruitment or coercion during recruitment, transfer, and 
transportation (10 indicators);164 (3) recruitment by abuse of 
vulnerability (16 indicators);165 (4) exploitative work conditions (9 
indicators);166 (5) coercion at destination (15 indicators);167 and (6) 
abuse of vulnerability at destination (7 indicators).168 
For each of the six identified dimensions of human 
trafficking, a combination of strong, medium, or weak 
indicators can indicate a positive assessment, meaning that the 
dimension is present for the victim. A positive assessment can 
include two strong indicators, one strong indicator and one 
medium or weak indicator, three medium indicators, or two 
medium indicators and one weak indicator. The final analysis 
involves combining all six elements to identify victims of 
 
about housing and living conditions”; “[d]eceived about legal documentation or obtaining 
legal migration status”; “[d]eceived about travel and recruitment conditions”; “[d]eceived 
about wages/earnings”; and “[d]eceived through promises of marriage or adoption.” The 
lone “[w]eak indicator” of deceptive recruitment is being “[d]eceived about access to 
educational opportunities.” ILO OPERATIONAL INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 15, at 4. 
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is “[v]iolence on victims.” “Medium indicators” include “[a]bduction, forced marriage; forced 
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 165 There are no strong indicators of recruitment by abuse of vulnerability for 
adult labor exploitation. “Medium indicators” include “[a]buse of difficult family situation”; 
“[a]buse of illegal status”; “[a]buse of lack of education (language)”; “[a]buse of lack of 
information”; “[c]ontrol of exploiters”; “[e]conomic reasons”; “[f]alse information about law, 
attitudes of authorities”; “[f]alse information about successful migration”; “[f]amily 
situation”; “[p]ersonal situation”; “[p]sychological and emotional dependency”; and 
“[r]elationships with authorities/legal status.” “Weak indicators” number the “[a]buse of 
cultural/religious beliefs” and “[g]eneral context” among their ranks. Id. 
 166 For adult labor exploitation, the “[s]trong indicator” of exploitative conditions 
of work is “excessive working days or hours.” “Medium indicators” include “[b]ad living 
conditions”; “[h]azardous work”; “[l]ow or no salary”; “[n]o respect of labour laws or 
contract signed”; “[n]o social protection (contract, social insurance, etc.)”; “[v]ery bad 
working conditions”; “[w]age manipulation.” “No access to education” is considered a 
“[w]eak indicator.” Id. 
 167 For adult labor exploitation, “[s]trong indicators” of coercion at the 
destination include “[c]onfiscation of documents”; “[d]ebt bondage”; “[i]solation, 
confinement, or surveillance”; and “[v]iolence on the victims.” “Medium indicators” 
include “[b]eing forced into illicit/criminal activities”; being “[f]orced [to perform] tasks [or 
take] clients”; being “[f]orced to act against peers”; being “[f]orced to lie to authorities, 
family, etc.”; the “[t]hreat of denunciation to authorities”; the “[t]hreat to impose even 
worse working conditions”; “[t]hreats of violence against victim”; being “[u]nder strong 
influence”; “[v]iolence on [the] family (threats or effective)”; and the “[w]ithholding of 
wages.” “Threats to inform family, community, or public” are considered “[w]eak 
indicators.” Id. 
 168 For adult labor exploitation, “[m]edium indicators” of the abuse of 
vulnerability at the destination include “[d]ependency on exploiters”; “[d]ifficulty to live 
in an unknown area”; “[e]conomic reasons”; “[f]amily situation”; and “[r]elationship 
with authorities/legal status.” “Weak indicators” are “[d]ifficulties in the past” and 
“[p]ersonal characteristics.” Id. 
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human trafficking. Based on the results, migrants are 
classified as successful migrants (no deception, no coercion, no 
exploitation), exploited migrants (exploitation without 
deception or coercion), victims of exploitation and deception 
(without coercion), and victims of trafficking for forced labor 
(deception, exploitation, and coercion). 
The information gleaned from the ILO/European 
Commission report is quite striking. First, work conditions that 
alone would not merit a charge of human trafficking can in 
combination pass the crime’s threshold requirements. For 
example, one could be deceived about the nature of the job and 
about wages or earnings (indicators of deceptive recruitment), 
subjected to excessive working hours and wage manipulation 
(indicators of exploitation), isolated or surveilled, subjected to the 
withholding of money and threats of violence (indicators of coercive 
recruitment), given false information about the law, or 
manipulated due to a difficult family situation or cultural/religious 
beliefs (indicators of recruitment by abuse of vulnerability). 
Additionally, one could have documents confiscated, be threatened 
with worse working conditions, or have wages withheld (indicators 
of coercion at destination). This could occur all while having 
difficulties in the past, a dependency on the exploiters, and a poor 
economic outlook (indicators of abuse of vulnerability at 
destination). This scenario would, according to the report, merit a 
charge of human trafficking for forced labor. Various other 
combinations of labor violations could also produce charges of 
human trafficking for lesser labor exploitation. 
The 2009 ILO/European Commission report is therefore 
significant for two reasons. First, it offers a reputable model for 
how experts across a region can develop a working consensus 
on the parameters of human trafficking—a model that could 
prove useful as the scope of human trafficking law continues to 
be debated. Second, the report is valuable for the experts’ 
specific consensus that the accrual of labor violations can 
produce the type of exploitation prohibited by anti-trafficking 
instruments. Interestingly, although the report understands 
migrant workers to be the paradigmatic face of human 
trafficking, the acts and harms that give rise to the charge of 
human trafficking need not result from a worker’s migrant 
status. In the above example, the abuse the worker suffers—
the conditions of work that merit a charge of trafficked work—
could be inflicted on many low-wage workers. This suggests 
that the wrong of human trafficking has less to do with the 
legal status of the workers than it does with the conditions of 
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the work endured by workers and by the broader assignation of 
duties and responsibilities that workers and employers are 
thought to owe one another. 
D. State of the Low-Wage Nation—Surveying U.S. Low-Wage 
Work Conditions and the New Low-Wage/Vulnerable 
Labor Paradigm 
In the landmark 2009 report, “Broken Laws, Unprotected 
Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Law in America’s 
Cities,” a team of expert policy analysts, researchers, and 
professors surveyed 4,387 low-wage workers in Chicago, Los 
Angeles, and New York City—the three largest cities in the 
United States.169 This report departed from the majority of prior 
studies in significant ways.170 It targeted a broader range of 
workers than those typically surveyed and took pains to include 
workers who often fall through the cracks, including 
unauthorized immigrant workers and workers paid in cash.171 
The report found widespread and systematic violations of 
the most basic workplace protections—the sort assumed to have 
been long addressed by U.S. labor law. Among the core labor 
protections routinely denied to U.S. low-wage workers are the 
right to be paid at least the minimum wage, the right to be paid 
for overtime hours, the right to take meal breaks, access to 
workers’ compensation when injured on the job, and the right to 
advocate for better working conditions.172 Wage violations were 
exceedingly common. Of those surveyed, 26% had been paid below 
minimum wage the week before; 60% of these were underpaid by 
more than $1 an hour.173 One-quarter worked more than 40 hours 
per week in “off the clock” unpaid labor; 76% were not paid the 
legally required overtime rate.174 Workers with violations had put 
in an average of 11 hours of underpaid or unpaid overtime.175 
Moreover, the survey found that 30% of the tipped workers 
surveyed were not paid the tipped worker minimum wage, which 
by state law is lower in New York and Illinois than the standard 
state minimum wage.176 
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Workers were also subjected to long working hours, at 
times without pay.177 One quarter of surveyed workers exceeded 
their work shift.178 Of those workers, 70% received no pay for 
extra work.179 Regardless of the form of payment (cash or check), 
in California, Illinois, and New York, employers are legally 
mandated to furnish workers with documentation of their 
earnings and deductions.180 Of those surveyed, 57% did not 
receive the required documentation, and 41% reported illegal 
employer deductions for damage or loss of work-related tools, 
materials, or transportation181 
Additionally, when low-wage workers attempted to 
assert their labor rights, legal processes failed them. One in 
five workers surveyed reported either filing a complaint or 
attempting to form a union in the last year.182 Of those, 43% 
experienced some form of retaliation, including termination or 
suspension, threats to cut hours or pay, and threats to call 
immigration authorities.183 Another 20% did not make a 
complaint even after suffering a serious workplace problem, 
such as the failure to be paid a minimum wage, discrimination, 
and dangerous working conditions,184 and 50% refrained from 
reporting violations due to fear of termination.185 Furthermore, 
10% failed to report due to fear of hour and wage cuts, while 
36% believed that reporting would not change the harmful 
practice or otherwise provide them with redress or relief. 186 
This brief account of U.S. low-wage work conditions 
evinces the continuities between erstwhile legal low-wage work 
and the kind of exploitative work that meets the legal definition of 
trafficked work. In this way, the new low-wage /vulnerable labor 
paradigm demonstrates how, depending on the context, human 
trafficking law may cast a wide enough net to include a 
significant portion of workers within the U.S. low-wage labor 
market. This is significant because it taps into the crisis inherent 
to human trafficking law itself: that of envisioning the act of 
human trafficking as befalling certain individuals or 
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understanding human trafficking as rooted in collective labor 
exploitation that does not discriminate by citizenship status. 
Further, comparing conditions of low-wage work with 
conditions that meet the legal definition of trafficked work shows 
that attempts to rescue or rehabilitate trafficked workers will not 
end their exploitation—not when an exploitative low-wage labor 
market is the liberation that awaits them. A low-wage/vulnerable 
labor paradigm reveals how, from chronic wage theft to increased 
vulnerability to on the job sexual violence, otherwise legal low-
wage work can look the same as the kind of exploitative work that 
meets the legal definition of trafficked work—even if other 
elements of a human trafficking charge are not present and 
human trafficking itself is not a supportable charge. As such, 
understanding human trafficking as having more in common with 
low-wage and vulnerable labor abuse than slavery or criminal 
gender violence is both normatively and descriptively more useful 
than interpreting human trafficking through those current 
dominant paradigms, which also tend to view all human 
trafficking as rooted in migration problems. 
V. RETHINKING SLAVERY, FORCED LABOR, AND 
EXPLOITATION 
The conflation of human trafficking with slavery risks 
upending distinctions between owning and exploiting human 
beings. While such distinctions are never clean or easy to discern, 
casting all human trafficking as slavery nevertheless muddies the 
waters in ways that might well hinder efforts to eradicate less 
severe forms of exploitation proscribed by anti-trafficking 
instruments in one of two ways. On the one hand, the charge of 
slavery can tilt the focus of anti-trafficking efforts towards the 
most extreme, “slave-like” abuses—the kidnapped woman 
chained to a bed in a brothel, the migrant worker beaten and 
forced to farm acres of arid land. Naming slavery as the core 
wrong of human trafficking thus cuts against expert consensus 
that the accretion of labor violations—at times in otherwise legal 
labor situations—can create exploitative conditions sufficient to 
merit a charge of human trafficking. 
On the other hand, calling all forms of human 
trafficking slavery runs counter to the careful debates within 
the international law of slavery that have taken place since the 
turn of the millennium. These judgments, which concern the 
relationships between slavery, forced labor, and sexual 
exploitation, recognize that the legal parameters of slavery are 
of enduring consequence. Deliberations about what constitutes 
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slavery are ultimately deliberations about what protections the 
international order of states are willing to enforce as jus cogen 
norms.187 Once again, less extreme exploitation proscribed by 
human trafficking law may slip through the cracks. 
Yet while the slavery paradigm is less than ideal, the 
desire to label all human trafficking as slavery is itself an 
impassioned response to the global expansion of capitalism in the 
1990s. While a full assessment of slavery law is beyond the focus 
of this article, the following sections track flashpoints in the legal 
trajectory of enslavement in the twenty-first century. In an age 
with little de facto slavery, contemporary international slavery 
judgments have reconfigured the meaning of “ownership” by 
incorporating acts under the rubric of slavery acts that more 
closely resemble force or coercion—the hallmarks of forced 
labor.188 This reformulation suggests that the new low-
wage/vulnerable labor paradigm is conceptually consistent with 
ongoing debates in slavery law proper. In other words, the new 
paradigm’s placement of working conditions—rather than 
movement/recruitment or slavery—at the heart of the offense 
does not introduce new difficulties in debates about how to 
distinguish severe instances of forced labor from slavery. Instead, 
by distancing human trafficking from a slavery paradigm, the 
new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm preserves the legal 
integrity of slavery by expressly locating the wrong of human 
trafficking in the exploitation of worker vulnerability through the 
imposition of poor labor and employment conditions. In this way, 
the new paradigm more clearly differentiates lesser exploitation 
from slavery proper. 
A. The Relationship Between Slavery and Human Trafficking 
Human trafficking’s definitional problems first necessitate 
the establishment of its wrong and then require an analysis of 
how the proffered wrong impacts debates within slavery law that 
concern the boundaries between slavery and forced labor. Control 
and ownership are at the heart of internationally accepted 
definitions of slavery.189 Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery 
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Convention establishes the benchmark definition of slavery: 
“Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all 
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”190 
Generally speaking, the wrong of slavery lies in treating 
a person as one would treat property and exerting ownership 
when no legal right to ownership exists.191 This understanding 
of slavery, coupled with the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibitions 
against slavery and involuntary servitude,192 established the 
initial operational and conceptual parameters of the TVPA.193 
How practitioners and policymakers define the wrong of 
human trafficking, however, contributes to the question of 
what acts constitute slavery. When, for example, the Obama 
administration characterized all human trafficking as at its 
core a problem of enslavement, it theoretically expanded the 
practical meaning of what it means to exercise “any or all of the 
powers attaching to ownership.” 
Initially, human trafficking was construed through a 
criminal gender violence paradigm—one that emphasized sex-
sector human trafficking. Under this framework, even consensual 
commercial sex acts could be deemed “sexual slavery” because the 
 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-28 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (describing 11 incidents 
of ownership: the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to 
income, the right to capital, the right to security, transmissibility, absence of term, 
prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution, and residuary character). 
 190 1926 Slavery Convention art. 1(1), supra note 8, 60 L.N.T.S at 263; see also 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 (defining enslavement as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the 
course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children”). 
 191 See R. M. Hare, What is Wrong with Slavery?, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 103, 104 
(1979) (arguing that even if slavery can be justified through a utilitarian calculus in an 
imaginary case, it is still wrong because it almost always causes misery in the actual world). 
 192 “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 193 Additionally, if the 1926 Slavery Convention rendered the suppression of 
slavery a standard of civilization that no state may abrogate, the presence of forced 
labor has historically had less bearing on the international assessment of a state’s 
civility. As Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, the British Delegate to the League of Nations 
and the primary drafter of the 1926 Slavery Convention noted, “I do not think that 
there is any nation, civilized or uncivilized, which does not possess powers enabling the 
Government, for certain purposes and under certain restrictions, to require forced or 
compulsory labor on the part of its citizens.” While the instant examples of mandatory 
military service and prison labor come to mind, the 1926 Slavery Convention’s 
demarcation between the absolute proscription of slavery and the more flexible 
approach to forced labor has resonated far beyond these practices, shaping our 
understanding and approach to human exploitation to this day. League of Nations, 
Question of Slavery: Report of the Sixth Committee: Resolution, League of Nations 
Official Journal, (Special Supplement 33) Records of the Sixth Assembly: Text of 
Debates, Nineteenth Plenary Meeting, Sept. 26, 1925, 156-57. 
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sexual self, in this view, could neither be owned nor alienated.194 
In contrast, the Obama administration explicitly understands 
human trafficking as embedded in the historical trajectory of U.S. 
slavery as a social institution. Louis CdeBaca, the current U.S. 
Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Human Trafficking 
in Persons, explains the trajectory of slavery and human 
trafficking as follows: 
In the wake of the Civil Rights Movement, there was a perception that 
the problem of slavery, of sharecropping, was a thing of the past . . . . 
And, quietly, the abusers were bringing in immigrants to replace the 
African American community . . . . The involuntary servitude and 
slavery program had been a little bit on the back burner during the ‘70s 
and ‘80s because of the gains of the Civil Rights Movement . . . . And, 
then, by the ‘80s and ‘90s, we were starting to see—whether it was 
Guatemalans, or Mexicans or others—suffering often in the same farms 
in the American South picking tomatoes, cucumbers, onions.195 
The Obama administration’s embrace of the term 
“modern slavery” is thus presented as a corrective to the prior 
administration’s overwhelming emphasis on sex-sector human 
trafficking. Proponents of this line of thinking applaud not only 
its renewed attention to non-sex-sector exploitation, but also 
the subject of that exploitation: migrant workers. Even those 
who are skeptical of the turn towards the explanatory power of 
slavery embrace efforts to assuage and address the plight of 
migrant workers, albeit through a labor paradigm.196 
While a slavery paradigm is not the best or most accurate 
approach to establishing the wrong of human trafficking, it would 
be a mistake to see “new abolitionism” arising in necessary 
opposition to a broader low-wage/vulnerable labor approach. The 
impulse to establish slavery—and in particular, the U.S. 
historical and legal experience of slavery—as a leitmotif for 
human trafficking is a real, if at times inchoate, attempt to 
grapple with the new realities of global labor exploitation. The 
resurrection of the U.S. experience of slavery through human 
trafficking law can be understood as an attempt to push back 
against one of the central tensions of slavery law: the tendency to 
“equate collective forms of oppression (political repression, racial 
discrimination and exclusion, etc.) with an individual relationship 
 
 194 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 195 Phillip Martin, Underground Trade Part Seven: Why Human Trafficking is 
Called Modern Day Slavery, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 6:58 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/phillip-martin/underground-trade-part-se_b_2929373.html 
[http://perma.cc/Z3GT-H3GS]. 
 196 See, e.g., Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking, supra note 5, at 1656-57. 
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between a master and a slave.”197 “Modern slavery” may well be 
moving towards recognition of the routinized, systemic face of 
modern labor exploitation. 
While the sentiment driving the rhetoric of modern 
slavery is laudable, it is, this article argues, nevertheless 
inadvisable to interpret the range of acts proscribed by human 
trafficking law as slavery. For legal scholars, the persistence of 
the term “modern slavery” in the context of human trafficking 
should urge a revisiting of what acts convey ownership that is 
tantamount to slavery.198 That said, the notion of “modern 
slavery” should also prompt a reappraisal of other, lesser forms 
of labor exploitation proscribed by human trafficking law, lest 
they fall through the cracks. 
For example, recent Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) cases in which labor-sector human 
trafficking was prosecuted as Title VII race and national-origin 
discrimination are indicative of this point.199 In four cases, two of 
which have been successful, the EEOC has adopted the language 
of human trafficking as slavery and used it to construe human 
trafficking as Title VII race, national origin, and sex employment 
discrimination in a series of class action suits geared towards  
 197 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Questions of Slavery and the 
Slave Trade in All Their Practices and Manifestations, Including the Slavery-Like 
Practices of Apartheid and Colonialism: Apartheid as a Collective Form of Slavery 1 
(July 2, 1981). 
 198 In another project currently in progress, I explore this complex of issues. 
See Reimagining Ownership: The Impact of Sexual Violence on the Law of Forced Labor 
and Slavery, draft project on file with author.  
 199 These EEOC human trafficking cases, some of which were initially filed 
during the Bush administration, have gained traction as a crucial component of the 
EEOC’s Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP) for 2013-2016. The SEP sets the direction of 
the EEOC, establishing EEOC priorities and identifying where it will invest the bulk of 
its resources and efforts to combat workplace discrimination, inequality, and injustice, 
of which human trafficking is but one component of a range of abuses that trouble low-
wage workers. The 2013-2016 SEP in part “target[s] disparate pay, job segregation, 
harassment, trafficking and discriminatory policies affecting vulnerable workers,” 
demonstrating that large class discrimination suits that include workers who have 
been trafficked may be no flash in the pan, but rather a sign of litigation to come. See 
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN, FY 2013-16, at 1 (2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm [http://perma.cc/67CY-YAQQ]; see also Chellen v. 
John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1247 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (involving Title VII race 
and national origin discrimination claims for the hiring of East Indian migrant workers 
for employment in a joint venture between John Pickle Co. and a Kuwaiti company); 
Consent Decree, EEOC v. Trans Bay Steel Corp., No. 2:06-cv-07766 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 
2008) (involving Title VII race and national origin discrimination claims for 48 Thai 
welders on H-2B visas); EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (D. 
Haw. 2012) (involving Title VII race and national origin discrimination claims for 
hundreds of Thai workers on H2-A visas); David v. Signal International, LLC, No. 08-
1220, 2012 WL 4344540, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2012) (involving Title VII race and 
national origin discrimination claims for 500 Indian nationals on HB-2 visas). 
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addressing the systemic abuse of vulnerable workers’ civil rights 
at U.S. worksites. This emerging case law illustrates some of the 
conceptual risks of understanding human trafficking within the 
U.S. model of slavery. In these cases, the severe racial and 
discriminatory core of slavery as a crime and experience pulls 
attention, again, towards migrant workers, who are racialized as 
the “new slaves.” This contributes, again, to a hyperfocus on the 
most extreme forms of migrant exploitation and fails to capture 
the more mundane, yet equally prohibited exploitation that 
affects migrant and nonmigrant workers. 
The new low-wage/vulnerable labor approach can be 
understood as a correction to the excesses of the TIP Office’s 
approach—as a necessary recalibration of legal norms in the wake 
of the globalization and technological changes of the 1990s. Much 
as the concept of labor law itself emerged from the failure of 
traditional contracts principles to produce a desirable balance 
between individual autonomy and the distribution of wealth in 
the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, the new low-
wage/vulnerable labor paradigm may be viewed as another turn 
of the wheel. 
Recent slavery case law bears out this claim, illuminating 
how ambiguities that now inhere within slavery law itself 
complicate its meaning and scope in ways that precede, presage, 
and implicate the legal discourse on human trafficking. Recent 
international judgments have undermined the boundary 
between slavery and forced labor.200 Further, as human rights 
courts have begun to hear slavery disputes, the framing of the 
issue has shifted from the traditional calculus of whether an 
individual engaged in the proscribed act of owning or controlling 
another person to an approach that evaluates whether the 
individual right to be free from slavery has been abrogated due 
to failures of the state.201 In other words, while human rights 
approaches to slavery still focus on the individual harm, they 
have also enhanced the political profile of slavery by holding 
states accountable for its occurrence in highly public ways—and 
they have done so at a time when the line demarcating slavery 
from forced labor has weakened. 
 
 200 See infra Section V.B. 
 201 See Siliadin v. France, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 363 (2005); Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65, 90 (2010); Ituango Massacres v. Columbia, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶ 141 
(July 15, 2005); Montero-Araguren v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, ¶ 28 (July 5, 2006). 
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A new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm will help make 
sense of these shifts. What the new low-wage/vulnerable labor 
paradigm offers is another angle on the slavery debates—one 
where the notion of control or ownership moves beyond individual 
bad actors, individual freedoms, and identity-based equality 
frames. The sum of anti-trafficking efforts amounts to an 
unacknowledged and undertheorized account of human 
trafficking’s wrong as rooted in the vagaries of low-wage and 
vulnerable labor. Recognizing human trafficking’s wrong as a low-
wage/vulnerable labor wrong answers the call from labor law 
scholars to broaden the scope of the discipline beyond 
employee/employer relationships, the work enterprise, and even 
individual states, to global labor markets more generally.202 This 
approach shows promise for moving human trafficking debates 
beyond the individualistic lens of human rights and discrimination 
frameworks that can characterize slavery.  
B. International Law and Judgments: De Facto Slavery 
and Its Proximity to Forced Labor 
If one were of the opinion that slavery was largely a relic 
of the past, a survey of twentieth-century international judgments 
on slavery would do little to dispel that notion. The twentieth 
century witnessed only one international judgment that touched 
on slavery—the 1905 Muscat Dhows case.203 Renewed popular 
and legal interest in the subject only converged in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century, when “sex slavery” in the former 
Yugoslavia and the wave of global labor migrations spurred by 
the ascent of global capitalism in the aftermath of the Cold War 
led to the passage of the first anti-trafficking instruments in 
roughly 60 years.204 Subsequently, a spurt of slavery cases 
appeared on the international scene, resulting in judgments by 
 
 202 New conceptualizations of labor law integrate its historical mission to 
protect and regulate economies with the contemporary realities of global markets and 
workplaces. See, e.g., Judy Fudge, Labour as a “Fictive Commodity”: Radically 
Reconceptualizing Labour Law, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 120, 128-29 (Guy Davidov 
& Brian Langille eds., 2011); Richard Mitchell & Christopher Arup, Labour Law and 
Labour Market Regulation, in LABOUR LAW AND LABOUR MARKET REGULATION 3 
(Christopher Arup et al. eds., 2006). 
 203 Muscat Dhows (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), XI RIAA 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1905). 
 204 See Siddarth Kara, SEX TRAFFICKING: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF MODERN 
SLAVERY (2009); Interviews with Siddharth Kara, COLUM. U. PRESS (Jan. 6, 2009, 10:53 
AM), http://www.cupblog.org/?p=488 [http://perma.cc/6G6Q-LTWH] (“Abolitionists must 
also not forget that powerful macroeconomic forces unleashed during the process of 
economic globalization in the post-Cold War era have been more responsible than any 
other force for the unforgivable rise in contemporary slavery.”). 
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the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY),205 the European Court of Human Rights,206 the Economic 
Community of West African States Community Court of 
Justice,207 and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.208 
The creation of our contemporary anti-trafficking legal 
regime accompanied and abetted this surge in international 
legal attention to slavery. Anti-trafficking provisions not only 
kept international interest in slavery alive but also allowed the 
public to interrogate the meaning and scope of slavery and 
other types of exploitation that occur both internationally and 
domestically. Jean Allain has called these developments the 
“renaissance of the legal definition of slavery.”209 
This renaissance, however, has not simply propelled the 
issue of slavery to legal prominence. It has also put pressure on 
the definitional parameters of the act, blurring distinctions 
between slavery and forced labor and forcing the question of 
what constitutes de facto slavery in an age where de jure 
slavery has been largely abolished.210 The first successful 
attempt to prosecute the crime of enslavement under 
international law is evocative of these tensions. The case also 
illustrates a kind of feedback loop between human trafficking 
and the high-profile “sexual slavery” prosecutions of the late 
1990s and early 2000s. 
The 2002 ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., was 
the first contemporary international decision on slavery.211 At 
this time, the early dominance of “sex trafficking” as the 
primary descriptor of human trafficking aided in ushering 
slavery back into the juridical spotlight. Simultaneously, the 
 
 205 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002). 
 206 See, e.g., Siliadin, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333; Rantsev, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 65. 
 207 Koraou v. Republic of Niger, App. No. ECW/CCJ/APP/08/08, Judgment, ¶ 72, 
The Court of Justice for the Economic Community of West African States (Oct. 27, 
2008), https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/case-law-doc/traffickingpersonscrimetype/ner/2008
/h_m__v__republic_of_niger_html/Hadijatou_Mani_v._Republic_of_Niger_Community_
Court_of_Justice_Unofficial_English_translation.pdf [http://perma.cc/NV5D-GTEB]. 
 208 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 195, Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/
AFRC/Appeal/675/SCSL-04-16-A-675.pdf [http://perma.cc/2QAX-JYDL]. 
 209 Jean Allain, The Legal Definition of Slavery in the Twenty-First Century, in 
THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY 199, 214-15 (Jean Allain ed., 2012). 
 210 Some cases arising before African regional courts, however, have involved 
situations that more closely resemble de jure slavery. See Malawi African Association et al. 
v. Mauritania, Comm., Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 a 196/97 and 210/98, African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶¶ 132-35 (May 11, 
2000), http://www.refworld.org/docid/52ea5b794.html [http://perma.cc/XES3-DZSK]. 
 211 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002). 
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equation of sex-sector human trafficking with slavery was fed 
by the new international judgments on slavery.212 
In Kunarac, Serbian militia members, pursuant to their 
involvement in the infamous “rape camps” of Foca, were charged 
with enslavement as a crime against humanity under Article 5(c) 
of the ICTY statute.213 Kunarac set the standard for subsequent 
tribunal and international legal treatments of slavery in ways 
that muddied the boundaries between slavery and forced labor. 
With no definition of slavery provided by the ICTY charter, the 
Trial Chamber II’s judgment lists acts that might constitute 
enslavement. The list of acts, however, contained language 
reflecting both ownership (slavery) and coercion (forced labor).214 
The Kunarac decision’s list of indications of enslavement included 
“elements of control and ownership.”215 
This ambiguity is mirrored in the more recent 
International Criminal Court (ICC) case regarding sexual slavery, 
 
 212 U.N. Special Rapporteur Gay McDougall, for instance, minced no words 
regarding the relationship of “sexual slavery” to slavery proper. “The term ‘sexual’ 
is . . . an adjective to describe a form of slavery, not to denote a separate crime.” Gay 
McDougall, Special Rapporteur, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, 
Sexual Slavery, and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998). 
 213 Statute of the International Tribunal art. 5(c), annexed to U.N. Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (adopted by S.C. Res. 
827, ¶¶ 1-2 (May 25, 1993)). 
 214  
Under this definition, indications of enslavement include elements of control 
and ownership; the restriction or control of an individual’s autonomy, freedom 
of choice or freedom of movement; and, often, the accruing of some gain to the 
perpetrator. The consent or free will of the victim is absent. It is often rendered 
impossible or irrelevant by, for example, the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion; the fear of violence, deception or false promises; the abuse of 
power; the victim’s position of vulnerability; detention or captivity, 
psychological oppression or socio-economic conditions. Further indications of 
enslavement include exploitation; the exaction of forced or compulsory labor or 
service, often without remuneration and often, though not necessarily, 
involving physical hardship; sex; prostitution; and human trafficking. . . . The 
“acquisition” or “disposal” of someone for monetary or other compensation, is 
not a requirement for enslavement. Doing so, however, is a prime example of 
the exercise of the right of ownership over someone. The duration of the 
suspected exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership is another 
factor that may be considered when determining whether someone was 
enslaved; however, its importance in any given case will depend on the 
existence of other indications of enslavement. Detaining or keeping someone in 
captivity, without more, would, depending on the circumstances of the case, 
usually not constitute enslavement. 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment of the Trial 
Chamber, ¶ 542 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001). For an 
illuminating discussion of these issues, see Cullen, supra note 188. 
 215 Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T ¶ 542. 
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Prosecutor v. Katanga.216 In this case, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
declared that sexual slavery, consistent with the Rome Statute’s 
and U.N. Rapporteur McDougall’s characterizations,217 could be 
regarded as a particular form of enslavement, yet the Pre-Trial 
Chamber still referenced forced labor and servile status.218 
Although the Pre-Trial Chamber’s judgment contained language 
concerning rights of ownership, its primary focus was on 
deprivation of liberty, sexual and otherwise.219 
This brief survey of slavery law demonstrates how the 
slipperiness between slavery and forced labor does not occur 
solely because of difficulties within human trafficking legal 
discourse, but rather also results from shifting perspectives of 
the wrong of slavery and who or what should be held 
responsible for providing redress. 
C. Differentiating Slavery, Forced Labor, and Other 
Exploitation: The New Low-Wage/Vulnerable Labor 
Paradigm’s Potential 
Viewing the wrong of human trafficking as a low-
wage/vulnerable labor wrong may help clarify the relationship 
between lesser forms of exploitation and slavery. If there are 
qualms about weakening the distinction between forced labor 
and slavery, then setting human trafficking’s wrong as a low-
wage/vulnerable labor one can help move past the Obama 
administration’s current attempts to cast all forced labor 
(through the elimination of the movement/recruitment 
requirement) as human trafficking and all human trafficking 
(including the lesser exploitations that also comprise it) as 
slavery. In other words, the new low-wage/vulnerable labor 
paradigm can not only more accurately reflect the range of 
harms prohibited by human trafficking law, it can also help 
keep legal debates about slavery focused on the very real issue 
of what separates it from forced labor. Clarifying the wrong of 
human trafficking will thus have the benefit of refining the law 
of slavery in that important way. 
Perhaps most significantly, the new low-wage/vulnerable 
labor paradigm has the potential to spur conversation not only 
about what it means to be a slave in the twenty-first century, but 
 
 216 Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges (Sept. 30, 2008). 
 217 See McDougall, supra note 212, ¶ 30. 
 218 Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07 ¶¶ 430-31. 
 219 For a more in-depth discussion, see Cullen, supra note 188, at 306-07. 
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what it means to be a worker in the twenty-first-century global 
economy. Understanding the wrong of human trafficking through 
the new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm could compel careful 
debate over the desired normative nature of the relationship 
between workers and the conditions of their work. Here, the work 
relationship is not reducible to an isolated connection between 
individual employees (migrant or otherwise) and employers. Nor 
is freedom in work understood simply as the ability to enter into 
an individual employment contract that one has the “choice” to 
embrace or decline. Rather, the new low-wage/vulnerable labor 
paradigm is the chance for a global reckoning of what social 
protections should be extended to workers based not on their 
status as citizens or migrants but rather on their labor-force 
membership status—on their identity as workers. Locating the 
wrong of human trafficking through the new low-wage/vulnerable 
labor paradigm offers both a coherent theory of why all acts 
proscribed by human trafficking law are wrong and an analytic 
blueprint for addressing the complex harms and root causes of 
human trafficking. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the standards adopted by international 
agencies and other federal departments, the U.S. TIP Office has 
attempted to absorb forced labor beneath the banner of human 
trafficking via an abandonment of any movement/recruitment 
requirement for a charge of human trafficking and  
simultaneously reconceptualize all human trafficking as slavery. 
These transformations in the law have occurred as an 
international push to incorporate a labor perspective in human 
trafficking law has taken root. This emergent labor perspective, 
which uses migrant labor as a template, understands that the 
accumulation of poor labor conditions, which individually might 
simply constitute discrete labor violations, can cross the threshold 
into human trafficking. 
The naming of human trafficking as modern slavery, while 
signaling the gravity of the act, fails to provide a full account of 
why all acts proscribed by human trafficking law, at the center 
and at the margins, are wrong. Moreover, the emerging labor 
migration paradigm, while usefully identifying human trafficking 
as a labor issue, analytically limits the would-be structural scope 
of a labor analysis of human trafficking by tacitly construing its 
wrong as an equality or autonomy wrong suffered by migrant 
workers. This labor migration perspective focuses on affording 
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migrant workers the same protections as nonmigrant workers in 
order to end exploitation. 
Yet neither the slavery nor the labor migration approach 
describe the full range of exploitative acts prohibited by primary 
anti-trafficking instruments. Less severe exploitation, including 
the accumulation of poor labor conditions that individually would 
not constitute actionable exploitation, are also proscribed—and 
largely neglected. This discretionary oversight has left many 
migrant and nonmigrant low-wage and vulnerable workers whose 
conditions of work might meet the requirements for a charge of 
human trafficking outside of legal analysis or attention. 
As a corrective, this article argues that the core wrong of 
human trafficking is a low-wage/vulnerable labor wrong, where 
the conditions of work (which includes commercial sexual acts) 
are controlling, independent of the migratory status of the 
workers themselves. Theorizing the wrong of human trafficking 
in this way, through what this article calls a new low-
wage/vulnerable labor paradigm, captures the full range of 
offenses proscribed by human trafficking law, from labor 
performed pursuant to enslavement to lesser exploitation. A low-
wage/vulnerable labor perspective also allows for a structural 
perspective on the wrong of human trafficking, understanding it 
as engendered by global labor markets and not individual 
wrongdoers alone.  
Approaching human trafficking law through the new low-
wage/vulnerable labor paradigm not only provides a 
comprehensive account of why all acts able to be prosecuted as 
human trafficking are wrong, it also helps preserve the legal 
integrity of one of the most serious violations recognized by law: 
slavery. The new low-wage/vulnerable labor paradigm ensures 
that the seriousness of slavery is maintained, while also assuring 
that deeply concerning acts of human trafficking are not 
overlooked simply because they do not resemble the extreme 
conditions of traditional slavery. For these reasons, a theoretical 
exploration of the wrong of human trafficking is necessary to halt 
the continuously shifting interpretations of its legal definition. 
Settling the wrong of human trafficking will help establish a more 
cohesive understanding of the problem. Doing so will establish 
firm ground to locate and oppose exploitation and the misery that 
it brings to workers at home and around the world. 
